


JPRS-UMA-84-067

25 October 1984

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS



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MEANS OF ACHIEVING, SUSTAINING EXCELLENCE DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 7, Apr 84 (signed to press 16 Mar 84) pp 45-49

[Article by Lt Col V. Emirov: "What Lies Behind the Good Reputation?"]

[Text] This is not the first year the rock artillery battalion commanded by Major V. Rystakov has been among the excellent ones. The fightingmen handled the weapons and combat equipment entrusted to them expertly, the crews performed smoothly and always destroy the targets accurately. The slogan for the socialist competition, "Be on the alert and in a constant state of readiness to defend the conquests of socialism!", means a daily struggle for the quality fulfillment of training plans, the tasks set for the subunits and the commitments. A spirit of rivalry for the achievement of good results in the mastering of the weapons and equipment and the achievement of the combat standards reigns in the classes, drills and exercises.

The honored title of excellent battalion earned through the joint military labor evokes in the fightingmen a desire to justify and affirm it by fulfilling their military duty honorably and diligently, and a desire to help their comrades improve their combat skill and their tactical fire training.

Of all the good qualities, a responsible attitude toward the job is perhaps the most visible. The sense of responsibility developed in the fightingmen by the commander, the communists and the Komsomol activists does not permit them to give their word frivolously or to put only half an effort into their work. The battalion's honor is the honor and the source of prestige of each soldier, sergeant and officer, and develops a sense of collective functioning in the men.

One naturally wants to know how this was achieved

Captain V. Barabanov, commander of one of the excellent batteries, did not answer the question immediately.

"We don't seem to be doing anything special. We explain to the soldiers in political classes, at meetings and in our ordinary everyday talks that the battery is a single combat organism. We use facts to convince them that a blunder, negligence or imprudence on the part of one specialist can let all of us down, so that we don't come anywhere near the target. And in a real battle an enemy is not going to wait until we are ready for a second salvo...."

The captain fell silent, thought for a moment and then added:

"And we do not feel there is anything shameful about reminding the men, about repeating the simple truth, that since the battery is an excellent one, then the collective and each individual member must excel in the training, in their bearing and in their treatment of one another. This means that no one should forget to congratulate a comrade on his success in the competition, to wish him a happy birthday, to help him if necessary. Nor should they be afraid to speak the truth to his face. Our Komsomol organization is a militant one."

In short, the outstanding subunit's main distinction is its solidarity and the strength of the combat family. When new men arrive in the battery, they are first introduced to the traditions: to study and work conscientiously, to value the honor of the collective, and to be sincerely concerned about the combat readiness of the battery and the battalion. They are shown the cups and the certificates won by achieving first place in the socialists competition. Most importantly, however, the commander and all the fightingmen see to it that a new comrade marches solidly in the common formation. This inviolable rule is implemented primarily by the officers-and-communists.

Captain A. Antonenko, for example, learned this from his own experience. He is far from a novice in the artillery. Before being transferred to the subunit, however, he dealt with different weapons systems. His very first exercise showed that his special training was inadequate. Since there was not much time left before a field firing exercise, everyone who could helped the officer. Major V. Rystakov, the battalion commander, who has an expert combat rating, shared his experience in training on his own and conducted a class on instructional methods in the battery, so that Antonenko would not fall flat, as they say. Captain V. Mikhaylov, chief of staff and also secretary of the party organization, helped him to plan his training time efficiently, brought to his attention certain specific points for refining his reports and gave him several pieces of advice. Every day, Captain V. Barabanov worked with his colleague on the equipment outside the scheduled classes. The commander and other comrades helped Antonenko get set up at his new station. This also motivated the officer to do his best, of course. In the atmosphere of friendly concern and interest, demandingness and monitoring, Antonenko rapidly overcame his lag and moved even with the other subunit members. And when the battery staddled the target with an accurate salvo in a night exercise, his fighting comrades rightly shared Captain Antonenko's success.

The very fact that most of the officers in the outstanding subunit are experts and all have a high rating and a consistently good performance in the artillery firing and tactical training and in other training subjects is of no small importance, of course. The positive example set by the commander and a senior comrade has indoctrinational force, after all, and becomes a powerful incentive. The fightingmen's demandingness of themselves and their comrades and their intolerance of deficiencies grow as a result. This was made perfectly apparent in Captain Barabanov's battery in the collective's attitude toward Private A. Starks. The soldier arrived in the subunit with the reputation of a "chronic" violator of discipline. I would like to point out that so-called "problem" soldiers are frequently transferred there. This is probably because the people there know how to re-educate them, and the battery simply has no unconscientious or undisciplined soldiers of its own.

In the beginning Private Starks attempted to follow the accustomed path. He did not make the effort to fulfill his service duties conscientiously and deviated from the established order. After encountering the universal condemnation of his co-workers, however, he understood that they would not permit him to do his job negligently. He gradually accepted the work and concerns of the collective. He later admitted that such simple questions from his comrades as "What's the matter, do you actually not understand that you are creating a problem for the entire battery, or are you just pretending to be a simpleton?" and "Do you plan to hide behind us in a battle as well?" forced him to look at his behavior differently. The section commander assigned the soldier the full combat load and constantly monitored what he did during the day. Under pressure from the Komsomol activists the soldier accepted a commitment to achieve good results in the training. He had to put forth a great effort and change his attitude. Private Starks began having failures in the service less and less frequently, and he passed the final inspection with an excellent rating.

We need to give proper credit to the commanders. While pointing out the soldier's diligence they did not hasten to award him the important title of excellent soldier. The fightingman himself was told this tactfully but candidly, and it was explained to the personnel when the results were summed up.

And so, collective demandingness prompts us to assess each individual from a standpoint of principle and produces mutual responsibility for the success of the common job and the honor of the subunit. The moral qualities of the fightingmen are also carefully considered in the battalion. The outstanding personnel are therefore distinguished not only by better results in the training, but their military skill is smoothly combined with a developed sense of duty, a readiness to give of themselves, and orientation to the achievement not simply of a good performance, but of the very highest end results in the improvement of their combat readiness. The outstanding collective is also distinguished among the adjacent subunits by its discipline, regulation appearance, internal order in the barracks and drill teamwork.

Those who have still not earned the important title, however, do not simply try to equal the excellent soldiers but are also more demanding of them and sometimes even envious. The attitude of colleagues in the unit toward the example and the experience of excellent subunits depends on what their prestige really means and whether it is authentic. And the fact that fightingmen are members of an outstanding collective should not only produce perfectly understandable pride in them but also make them feel certain obligations.

Unfortunately, however, this is not always the case. Take the missile battalion in which Captain V. Maksyutenko is commander of an excellent launching battery, for example. We got to know the men and learned about the state of affairs in the battery. We found that there are failings in the trainings and the performance of the service, that there are deficiencies in equipment maintenance and in the internal order, and that many of the soldiers are not outstanding with respect to drill sharpness.

The demands made even of the excellent soldiers have been lowered in the collective. Take Sergeant Yu. Slesarenko, for example. His successes in the training are not brilliant, he is negligent in the performance of his service duties, and the discipline of his subordinates leaves something to be desired. This is true

of Junior Sergeants N. Shishkunov, I. Yasakov and N. Gureu. And since the right-flank members have this attitude toward the job, it is not surprising that the other fightingmen are not greatly concerned about the honor and reputation of the excellent subunit. In fact, just how does it differ from the other batteries and companies which have not been awarded this important title?

Officer N. Kharchuk heads an excellent platoon in that battalion. We learned that his professional training is poor and that his performance discipline suffers. "Kharchuk deserves none of the credit for the fact that the platoon is an excellent one," the battalion officers said. In that case, can the collective be considered an excellent one and be given a high standing in the competition?

"The instructions for determining the outstanding men and the outstanding subunits do not cover such a situation," the battalion political worker said.

With a careful study of the instructions, however, it is not difficult to see that a subunit can become an excellent one when, along with other successes, excellent results have been achieved in the special training of the officers and when firm military discipline is maintained in the collective.

What do these cases tell us? Mainly that a desire for prominence, a desire to enjoy the reputation of an excellent subunit sometimes makes certain officers lenient with respect to assessing the results of the fightingmen's military work and motivates them to make the situation seem better than it actually is. This is ostensibly done with the very best of intentions. Every collective must have its beacons, the reasoning goes. This develops wholesome self-esteem, and the struggle for first place in the competition becomes more acute. Some unit commanders take this position and do not see any great problem in the fact that at times and in some ways a subunit does not measure up to the important title, but award it the title as though in advance. But others can see through such things, and in the indoctrinational sense they have a negative rather than a positive effect.

The competition opens up great possibilities for combat and moral improvement for the fightingmen. As in any undertaking, however, success in the military work does not come by itself. In order to prevent the title of excellent subunit from fading away in the very first serious test, it is necessary to constantly increase the effort, to set more difficult goals and achieve them without fail. And the reputation and prestige of the excellent are frequently undermined where this simple truth is forgotten.

...Senior Lieutenant K. Valeyev's excellent tank company could have performed the tactical exercise far better. Operating at night and in a roadless area, the tanks were unable to maintain the necessary speed and were late in arriving at the designated site. Private S. Indyukov, mechanic-driver 1st class, received a "two." Nor did certain other tankmen among those listed as outstanding in the combat and political training give a good performance.

Was what happened especially surprising to the collective? I think not. The company had been falling back slowly but surely, as they say. The signs were apparent not just in the combat training. The state of discipline had deteriorated markedly, there were violations of the daily schedule, and the men were

sometimes out of uniform. Private V. Gonchar, for example, committed a gross infraction. The tankmen began hearing their colleagues say more and more frequently: "And this is an excellent company!" Deficiencies in the organization of the training and the service and a deterioration of the political and indoctrinational work ultimately caused the company to lose its honored title and its reputation as one of the best in the formation.

Should we attach much importance to what happened, since another company in the battalion soon became an excellent one? I heard officers in the subunit express this opinion. It is apparently based on the fact that the battalion commitments are ordinarily worded in the following manner: "Develop excellent companies--one...." Senior Lieutenant K. Valeyev's company was an excellent one but now the success had been achieved by Senior Lieutenant S. Kozhevnikov's men. With respect to numbers everything was in order! The battalion commander, its political worker and party activists now began praising the new leader and citing it as an example. They did not make a serious study of or an investigation into the failures experienced by the former excellent company, however.

The casual attitude taken by certain of the excellent personnel toward their own prestige is apparently due not just to their complacency and their belief that their present reputation will by inertia take them into the ranks of the outstanding, but also to the fact that they are not receiving proper attention from the superior chiefs and party organizations. It is perfectly understandable and easy to explain why the communists in charge and the party activists work more with the lagging subunits, helping them to rise to the level of those out front. Experience has shown, however, that they also need to work with the excellent military collectives. The thorough publicizing of their experience, the extensive demonstration of their achievements, and publicity in the summation of their military rivalry motivates the outstanding personnel to be stricter and more demanding of themselves. Most importantly, however, this kind of attention promotes the revelation and use of new reserves for improving the quality of the training, for strengthening discipline and organization and improving combat readiness.

This is convincingly confirmed by the experience of a motorized rifle regiment awarded the Banner of the USSR Minister of Defense for courage and military valor. Its command element and its party organization constantly see to it that the excellent personnel serve as a model in all things and justify the important title with new successes in their military work.

Officers from the regimental directorate and members of the party committee frequently work in the excellent antitank battery commanded by Senior Lieutenant B. Shevchuk, for example. They help the commander to smoothly organize the training process, the party-political work and the competition. Their influence had something to do with the fact that the antitank personnel accepted a commitment to earn excellent ratings for all the fire missions.

Major A. Litvinenko, a member of the unit party committee, is something of a permanent patron of the subunit. He did a great deal to help young Lieutenants D. Robitashvili and A. Slabynya to develop rapidly and to increase militancy in the work of the party and Komsomol organizations. His report at a party meeting, at which the battery communists discussed their tasks stemming from decisions adopted at the December 1983 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee,

motivated the party members to take a demanding look at things and set the tone for a principled critique and for the earnest resolution of pressing problems. Among other things, Senior Lieutenant Shevchuk and the other communists waged an active campaign against the conceit and complacency of Junior Sergeant S. Tikhanovich, a section commander, and of certain other veteran soldiers. During a camp assembly at a mountain range the party activists helped the battery commander organize competition among the crews for the best fulfillment of missions and standards and to give publicity and comparability to the achievements of the soldiers and sergeants in exercises and drills and throughout the training day.

...The order to take up a fire position on the left flank of the regiment's breakthrough sector found the battery in the concentration area. The combat vehicles had completed their move undetected and deployed in the direction from which there was the danger of a tank attack. The dust had barely settled, when the first "enemy" tanks appeared from behind some hills. Antitank guided immediately left the launcher guides and rushed towards the targets. It took the crews of the combat vehicles commanded by Sergeants S. Osipov and O. Galich only minutes to destroy four targets. Battery officers B. Shevchuk, D. Robitashvili and A. Slabynya also organized the training battles and directed the fire skillfully in the complex, fast-moving situation. The excellent personnel had entered their latest victory in their personal record with a confident hand.

The climate created in the collective of wholesome dissatisfaction with that which had been accomplished and achieved, the sense of responsibility of each individual for the honor and the good name of the excellent battery and naturally, the close attention, the specific assistance, the demanding attitude and party concern received from the senior chiefs and the regimental party committee also had a lot to do with the fact that the collective moves from one success to another in its combat improvement.

It is said that demandingness of oneself is the highest form of self-respect. A sense of responsibility and self-demandingness do not simply come to the outstanding personnel. Only purposive, joint efforts by the commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations can motivate the personnel to earn the important title of excellent subunit and justify it with honor.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

FORMALISM, INACTIVITY IN POLITICAL WORK ASSAILED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 7, Apr 84 (signed to press 16 Mar 84) pp 50-56

[Article by Lt Gen A. Shirinkin, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District: "Unity of Decision and Implementation"]

[Text] It is not an easy task to earn the title of excellent unit. And it is no less difficult to retain the title. Fightingmen in outstanding motorized rifle regiment "X" are successfully coping with this task. The motorized riflemen demonstrate good combat training in tactical exercises, firing practice and driving classes. The success, let us underscore right off, is due in great part to the fact the party organization works constantly to see that the words and deeds of the regimental communists, their plans and actions, are one and the same. The party members and candidate members there strive to assure unity of decisions and the organizational work performed for their implementation, and are thoroughly aware of their responsibility for the assigned area of the work. And this helps the collective to achieve consistent results in the combat training.

Unity of decision and implementation, inseparability of words and deeds, is an important feature of the Leninist workstyle. "The slogan precisely of practicality and precisely of efficiency," V.I. Lenin taught us, "is the main and immediate thing now." Lenin's ideas and positions on unity of decision and implementation have undergone creative development in documents produced at party congresses and plenums of the CPSU Central Committee. The art of leadership, the 26th party congress pointed out, does not consist in producing and squandering directives on every occasion. After adopting a decision, we must achieve its absolute implementation within the specified period of time.

The party's demands with respect to improving implementation efficiency in each area of the work and for every decision adopted run prominently through materials of the November 1982, June and December 1983 plenums and the special February 1984 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. The party Central Committee stresses specific organizational work in the masses. Words and deeds must never diverge, and formality must never be substituted for the actual work. This is the party's demand. Planned measures, Comrade K.Yu. Chernenko underscored in his speech at the special February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, will only be carried out if their implementation becomes the main substance of the daily work of each party organization and of each worker.

Following instructions from the 26th party congress and subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, the military council, the political directorate, political organs, staffs and party organizations of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District strive constantly to improve their workstyle and work persistently to achieve unity of decision and implementation and to establish efficiency of implementation in the work performed to fulfill the party's demands and orders and directives issued by the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. These problems are regularly discussed at meetings of the district military council, at assemblies of commanders and chiefs of political organs, and at seminars of party and Komsomol activists. During the past training year, for example, the military council discussed and outlined ways to improve performance discipline in the district forces. This was also the subject of discussion at a scientific and practical conference of leading district personnel. This matter is regularly brought up at assemblies of chiefs of political organs, secretaries of party committees and party buros, regular propagandists and Komsomol workers.

The experience accumulated in the district forces shows that combat tasks are performed more successfully and the party-political work is more effective where there is no gap between decision and implementation, where there is thoroughly conceived and precisely organized control over who performs the work, and how, and where the practical results of the planned steps and the degree of their expediency are foreseen. V.I. Lenin taught us that all managerial art consists in knowing in good time where to concentrate the main efforts and attention and taking this into account.

Much of this is taken into account and applied in the practical work in the party organization of the regiment in which Major A. Kochiyev is one of the party committee members. At one time the maintenance of combat equipment was a source of great concern in the unit. The formation commander and political section made a thorough study of the state of affairs in the unit and determined the causes of the irregular situation. It turned out that not all of the officers in the technical service were performing their duties completely and conscientiously. The inadequate training of drivers was also a factor.

At the political section's recommendation the communists thoroughly discussed their role in eliminating the urgent problem at regimental and battalion meetings. They gave special attention to the unsatisfactory organizational work of certain CPSU members. They severely criticized those comrades who advocated activeness and initiative but were in fact not demonstrating those qualities and setting an example in the performance of their party and service duty. The party meetings defined steps to enhance the responsibility of party members and candidate members for the maintenance and skillful operation of combat equipment. The party committee heard reports from certain communists directly responsible for the state of the equipment. The party committee also concerned itself with improving technical propaganda and stimulating the work of technical groups. Technical quizzes were conducted in the battalions and companies and the best specialists exchanged know-how in operating and caring for the combat equipment. The work of the agitation and propaganda group's technical military propaganda sections was vitalized. Supernumerary propagandists delivered lectures on technical subjects in the companies, tying their content closely with the requirements governing the procedure for storing and operating the combat equipment.

We can see that the unit not only worked out specific steps to improve the care of the combat equipment, but also saw to the implementation of the steps outlined. The people's sense of responsibility for knowing about the equipment and its operation increased as a result. It is with good reason that the specialists give a high rating to the way in which the combat equipment is cared for and operated in the unit. I believe the fact that 70 percent of the fightingmen have become specialists with higher ratings also says a great deal. What is noteworthy is that many of them are communists.

It would be incorrect to state that all of the party organizations and political organs have strong unity of words and deeds, of decision and implementation, of course. There are still many shortcomings in this area. The decisions themselves frequently make it difficult to fulfill them. They are vague, contain general appeals, do not specify the responsible parties and do not bind anyone to anything. It is difficult to monitor the implementation of such decisions. Paperwork and repeated adoption of resolutions--again, frequently non specific resolutions on the same issue--are at times substituted for vital organizational work. Bombast and empty talk are especially intolerable in party work. They are directly contrary to one of its basic principles--unity of words and deeds. Unfortunately, however, we still encounter these things.

Take a Guards motorized rifle training regiment, for example. Last year some of its subunits were unable to achieve good results in the combat and political training and in the strengthening of military discipline. Why did this happen? There are many factors, but I would mention one in particular. A study made of the regimental party committee's workstyle by the district political directorate showed that it was not persistent with respect to the implementation of decisions, especially those aimed at assuring that the party members and candidate members set a good personal example in the service and with respect to discipline, and did not see to it that the communists took an active part in the organizational and the ideological and indoctrinational work. This is borne out by the facts. Officers and communists V. Sukhov, A. Lukashev and V. Belyayev, for example, demonstrated inefficiency and lack of organization and committed infractions of discipline more than once. Every second CPSU member did not fulfill his socialist commitments. More than once the regimental party committee adopted decisions which essentially consisted in increasing the demandingness applied to the communists and hearing reports from some of them on the fulfillment of their party and military duty. The decisions got no further than that, however. This accounted for the small role played by party members and candidate members in the accomplishment of the combat training tasks and in the effort to establish firm military discipline. It also had a great deal to do with the fact that the unit fell back from the forward positions it previously occupied.

No matter how good a document is accepted, it has no magic power. Failure is inevitable unless it is backed up with vital organizational work. The following is yet another confirmation of this. A specific and serious decision was adopted at a meeting on the subject "On Enhancing Effectiveness and Principle in the Work of the Primary Party Organization" in the party organization in which officer V. Skalozubov is secretary. It was planned to implement the decision over a period of many months. Most of the measures specified in the resolution were not carried out, however. The party activists got down to work only after the

measures were no longer of immediate importance. It is obviously due precisely to poor implementation discipline and the absence of control that decisions are sometimes not fulfilled on schedule or not completely fulfilled or are left hanging in the air altogether.

A matter of essential importance--verification of implementation--has to be mentioned. It would truly be difficult to overstate its importance. V.I. Lenin considered the verification of implementation to be the main thing in all the organizational work, along with the selection of cadres. He made the following statement: "To check on the people and verify the actual performance of a job--all of the work and all policy now hinge upon this, I repeat, on this and only this." The organization of control is one of the most important tasks. This is stated with new force in the decrees passed by the party Central Committee: "On the Further Improvement of Control and Verification of Implementation in Light of Demands Set Forth at the 26th CPSU Congress" and "On the Work of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee to Improve the Workstyle and Methods of Party Organizations in Light of Decisions of the November 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee." The party has set the task of further raising the level of the organizational work and stepping up control and verification of implementation.

Smoothly organized control and verification of performance helped to reveal and correct shortcomings in good time, to efficiently adjust the organizational and the political and indoctrinational work to conform to the situation, and to make it more purposive and effective. Control and verification of performance are also an extremely important means of indoctrinating the cadres in a spirit of strict observance of party and state discipline and an effective method of combating lack of responsibility, sham and indulgences in the combat training, and lack of organization. Experience has shown that the best results are achieved where implementation is verified systematically and from top to bottom, with extensive involvement of the communists, where every breakdown and every failure to carry out the assigned job is given an assessment based on principle.

Experience also teaches us that control produces perceptible results only when it is performed constantly and efficiently, when it is combined with organizational work and with on-the-spot, specific assistance for the aktiv in correcting shortcomings and overcoming difficulties. There are many forms of verification. The most important are the thorough study of the state of affairs at the site, the regular submission of reports to the political organs by party committees (party buros), and the presentation of reports by secretaries on the completion of planned work to meetings of the communists. They also include periodic reports by the elected party organs, the briefing of primary party organizations by political organs on their work, and the presentation of reports by party members and candidate members. They include the critical study of information, critical comments and suggestions made at meetings and conferences, letters, statements and warning signs in the press. Verification of implementation is purposive, specific and objective. It covers the main issues of party-political work stemming from the tasks involved in maintaining combat readiness and from the situation which exists in the formation, the unit and subunit.

The main objective of verification and control is not just to reveal shortcomings, but also to organize steps to remedy them. Those doing the verifying must feel

the organizer's hand. In order to set up the units in precisely this manner, however, we feel that it is necessary to give careful attention to the composition of the groups of officers sent out into the forces. For example, we include in the groups competent workers with adequate practical experience, capable not only of verifying what is being done in a specific area of the work, but also of providing commanders and political workers with necessary assistance in organizing the work. We know that the main significance of control in the Leninist understanding lies in assuring unity of decision and implementation, preventing possible errors and failings, and being able to correct matters, "to provide real assistance, even if only on a small scale."

The groups include officers from the political directorate, the staff, the combat training directorate, the rear service, other directorates and services, military legal experts and doctors. They are ordinarily headed by a member of the district military council. A group's main task is to teach the responsible individuals in the formations and units how to perform their duties well, and to help them organize the training process and the political and indoctrinational work in the subunits, to set up the guard and garrison services, to improve personal services for the fightingmen and to eliminate any shortcomings. A practice has developed whereby the officers of the comprehensive group set up demonstration classes and classes on instructional methods, give lectures, present reports and conduct talks on subjects pertaining to political and military indoctrination. The results of the inspection are ordinarily discussed at a meeting of the party committees (party buros). The conclusions drawn from the results of comprehensive inspections are discussed in the district military council, at which the commanders and political workers involved also report on steps being taken to correct the shortcomings. During the past training year, for example, comprehensive groups worked in almost every second unit in which infractions of discipline had been detected at one time or another. The situation had been remedied in most of them. This work practice is becoming widespread in the district political organs and formation staffs.

I want to point out that we still have individual commanders and political workers who do not demonstrate proper activeness in the day-to-day training, during the heavily loaded workdays, but wait for senior comrades to come, inspect their work and give them assistance. Until recently there were infractions of military discipline in certain subunits of the motorized rifle regiment in which Major N. Bukov is a member of the party committee. One of the inspections brought out the fact that the party committee was doing a poor job of studying the situation in the subunits and not working adequately with the lower-level aktiv. The following was also discovered, which says a lot: For a long time not even the secretary of the party committee had attended party meetings in the battalions and companies once, not to mention the other party committee members and the activists. The senior comrades set the party activists straight, of course, and provided them with specific assistance in setting up the organizational and the ideological and indoctrinational work. And this produced results. The elective organ began to take a closer look at all aspects of the life and training of the personnel and increased its influence on the situation in the unit. The situation soon improved.

This confirms once again how important it is during an inspection to provide new impetus in all the organization's affairs and for the local activists themselves not to wait for senior comrades to come and point out the shortcomings, but to detect and remedy them promptly, mobilizing all the forces of the communists to be active and to demonstrate initiative.

I recall yet another instance having to do with this. The regimental commander was speaking at a conference in one of the district units. He properly discussed the complexity of the international situation and the need to be in a constant state of complete combat readiness and to maintain the weapons and the combat equipment in a state of readiness. When the officer completed his speech, someone in the room could not keep from asking why there were shortcomings with respect to equipment maintenance in the regiment. It was apparent that the question put the commander on the spot. The officer had probably not seriously thought about the conclusions to be drawn from his own talks, appeals and demands.

The above demonstrates how important it is for every party activist and every communist to struggle actively to strengthen unity of words and deeds in both his own work and that of the party organization. Yes, this is necessitated both by the heightened requirements and--I would especially stress--by the extraordinary complexity of the world situation, the essence of which has been thoroughly revealed in statements by our party and state leaders. The communists and all the district fightingmen are drawing the correct practical conclusions from them and are doing more to increase vigilance and combat readiness by the day.

As we have already seen, however, we still find examples of a different nature, albeit rarely. Some individuals say that they recognize the importance of working actively and intensively, of accomplishing everything one is instructed to do, while in fact not deriving any real conclusions for themselves. This occurs most frequently where constant and effective verification of performance is lacking or where the monitoring is superficial. I shall cite an example.

During the past training year the officers in one of the district's tank regiments came out with an initiative--to struggle for a good class rating. The initiative was approved and was explained to the personnel of all the units. Then it came time to report on the fulfillment of commitments. It turned out that some of the comrades had not achieved their goals. One of the reasons was the fact that when officers from higher headquarters had made their inspection they had only revealed deficiencies in the organization of the officer training and had not attempted to find the true causes and take steps to prevent a repetition of past errors. Nor did the regimental party committee, of which Lieutenant Colonel A. Silenko is a member, or the formation's political section do a commendable job. They could have held strictly accountable those communists whose deeds do not match their words and taken steps to see that decisions were followed by practical action assuring absolute fulfillment of the socialist commitments accepted. This did not occur, however. And this accounted for the uninspiring results.

Experience has shown that in order to achieve unity of words and deeds it is necessary first of all to instill in the cadres a sense of great responsibility

for the fulfillment of decisions, to prevent shortcomings, to utilize progressive know-how and provide the leaders with it. This means achieving a situation in which the comrades mentioned are in constant and close contact with the masses, understand their attitudes and needs and lend a sensitive ear to suggestions coming up from below. It is why, as the military council, the political directorate and the political organs concern themselves with implementing Lenin's demand for unity of words and deeds in the daily work, they attach great importance to developing in the leading cadres a sense of responsibility for the accomplishment of that which has been accepted, approved and planned. The rendering of accounts and reports by those cadres is one of the effective ways of doing so. This training year the district military council has already heard reports from communists in charge B. Shatalin, L. Vinogradov, V. Zakharov and M. Sharamko, and V. Kozak, L. Reznik, N. Chervinskiy, A. Timoshenko, and other communists have given reports in the political directorate. Furthermore, we have become convinced this rendering of accounts produces the greatest benefit when it is preceded by a thorough study of the state of affairs at the sites.

The rendering of accounts and reports by the communists in charge, with a preliminary check on their performance, makes it possible to determine precisely how a specific official is organizing the work in his area, whom to help, and who should be brought to strict account. We regard the rendering of accounts and reports not just as a form of monitoring, but also as a means of increasing the responsibility of the people and of working out the most expedient measures with them.

For example, the political directorate made a thorough study of the workstyle used by the staff political section and the district directorate for directing the primary party organizations, and of the functioning of the party organizations themselves. In the course of our work we made a study of how the ideological and theoretical training of the communists is set up, what is done to assure that they set a good personal example in the service, in the training, and in discipline, and whether they are all conscientiously fulfilling their party and military duty and affecting the situation in the forces. The study of these matters was completed with a review at party meetings of the directorates and sections of measures to further improve the workstyle used by party organizations in their efforts to assure unity of decision and implementation.

The political directorate used the findings from the inspection to conduct a seminar of secretaries of directorate and section party organizations. Lieutenant Colonel L. Popov, deputy chief of a political section, presented a report in the political directorate. After this work was completed both the officers in the political section and those in the political directorate still had a lot to do, of course. It can now be stated, however, that the party organizations of the directorates and sections have begun demonstrating greater militancy, activeness and principle in their work and are making a greater effort to complete what they have started. The officers and the directorates and the staff officers have a greater sense of responsibility for the fulfillment of their party and service duty. They have begun organizing the work in the forces more purposefully, specifically and consistently.

We constantly strive to see to it that the officers in the political directorate--inspectors, lecturers and senior instructors--are imbued with a sense of special responsibility for the fulfillment of party decisions, our own decisions and instructions. Our section chiefs report on what they have done each month for this purpose. We also have the inspectors, senior instructors and members of the lecture groups present such accounts and reports on the results of the training year. These reports help the sections and their officers to work more persistently and to exert a more active influence on the tasks being performed by the troops, the implementation of instructions from the political organs and resolutions passed by party organizations.

Individual talks by the senior chiefs with subordinate commanders and political workers are also an effective way of increasing their performance efficiency and sense of responsibility. It is important, however, for these talks to be frank, confidential and demanding in the party manner. In a talk with superiors certain officials will sometimes tend to make it sound as though things are going smoothly when they are not, to remain silent about the real state of affairs or to embellish them. Whether or not a talk is useful depends in great part on the senior chief, upon his tact, his ability to get his subordinate to open up, his knowledge of the subordinate's strong and weak points.

The study of letters, complaints and statements from the fightingmen and their moods also helps us to gain a thorough understanding of the state of affairs in the units and how orders, directives and decisions are carried out there. The district military council studied the handling of letters, complaints and statements in the forces twice last year alone. In addition, we send responsible workers to the sites to check out the most acute warning signs. The practice of receiving visitors right in the military units and installations has been expanded. Question-and-answer evenings are regularly held in the formations and units and installations, with the participation of communists in leading positions. All of this helps us to gain a better understanding of the situation at the sites, to react promptly to the requests of the fightingmen and to strive for the complete fulfillment of decisions.

As we look over all of the work performed to assure unity of decision and implementation, we see in it both definite successes and many yet unutilized possibilities. The commanders, political organs and staffs in our district are focusing their efforts on furthering improving the style used in this work. We see in unity of intentions and actions, words and deeds, the key to successful accomplishment of the tasks assigned the Soviet Armed Forces by the 26th party congress and subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

IMPROVED PROPAGANDA MATERIALS, METHODS SOUGHT

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 7, Apr 84 (signed to press 16 Mar 84) pp 57-61

[Article by Col V. Mikhaylovskiy, senior instructor in the Department of Marxism-Leninism at the Military Radio Engineering Air Defense Academy imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov: "Problems of the Specific-Focus Method--Discussion of the Article 'The Expanses of Creativity and the Dead-Ends of Formalism'"]

[Text] I read Guards Major V. Kuznetsov's article with interest. It raised some urgent questions pertaining to the improvement of Marxist-Leninist training for the officers. I wanted to express my opinion too. Specifically, the author notes that we are still slow in adopting the active forms of political training in the work and that the propagandists are taking only timid steps in this direction. One has to agree with him. I say this on the basis of my own observations and my service and propaganda experience.

I have recently helped in the inspection of more than 20 Marxist-Leninist training groups. The number of students with a higher education is 100 percent or approaches that figure in the absolute majority of them. When we compare this with what we had 3 or 4 years ago, we are immediately struck by the fact that the curve describing the educational level is rising sharply. The existing methods used in the classes, however, have not yet undergone those changes which are urgently dictated by life itself and by decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the June 1983 plenum of the party's Central Committee. There is still considerable formalism and dogmatism in the way the classes are conducted. This prevents the officers from thoroughly understanding the questions they study and from seeing the linkage between theory and life. A survey conducted in several groups shows that almost 40 percent of the students were not entirely satisfied with the state of their training or the quality of the classes and lectures. What specifically did not suit them? The obsolete approach to the selection of training materials for a specific subject. Poor consideration of changes occurring in the level of education and the needs of the students. The meager range of training methods, which does not motivate the officers to discuss things or engage in a lively exchange of opinions.

The answers to the same questions given by students from the formation in which the groups are led by Colonel V. Sukharev, Lieutenant Colonels V. Bondarenko, S. Golovyuk and A. Kas'yanov, and Major N. Kuzenets are in a completely different vein, however. They indicate that the training has become far more interesting since the specific-focus training methods began to be used.

The use of the special-focus method in the Marxist-Leninist training is something totally new for many people. As we know, it is not always easy for new things to gain "the right to register." A shortage of methodological literature, a lack of specialists capable of helping the propagandists properly understand the essence of the special-focus method and apply it in the work, and a relatively small body of experience in the accomplishment of this task--all of this is hampering the work considerably. In my opinion, articles recently appearing in the periodic press (with rare exceptions) only explain the theoretical principles of the specific-focus method and describe its superiority over the traditional methods.

I believe that sooner or later reality will make it imperative for us to develop a special methodological aid on Marxist-Leninist training for officers, which will contain specific recommendations for the practical use of the new method, closely linked with each subject studied under the plan. Why do I say this? I shall tell you. Many of the group leaders are still timid when it comes to adopting the new method. Some of them openly admit that they are biding their time, planning to take advantage of the experience of someone else someday. This is just one aspect of the matter, however. Another aspect, in my opinion lies in the fact that the new method forces the propagandists to spend far more time preparing for the classes than they do with the traditional method. Consequently, an already acute shortage of time for independent preparation becomes even greater. And this gives rise to the opinion, perfectly understandable from the psychological standpoint, that it might be better to follow the known, beaten path. Less effort is required, and the result is more or less acceptable. The barrier of inertia proves to be higher than the desire to try new things.

The training is ordinarily not very effective in those groups in which the leaders hold this opinion and where the obsolete approach predominates. The situation is entirely different where the leaders and the students engage in a constant search and are not satisfied with what has been achieved, where new forms and methods of mastering Marxist-Leninist theory receive all-around support. In the unit in which Lieutenant Colonel G. Sokhanenko is the political worker, for example, most of the officers' Marxist-Leninist training groups have now acquired considerable experience in the use of the specific-focus method in the classes. The vast majority of the students there have a solid knowledge of theory and are able to apply it effectively in the performance of combat and political training tasks. And not so long ago the situation was completely different....

The chief of the political section once visited classes in the groups led by Lieutenant Colonel S. Golovyuk and Major N. Kuznets. His impression was not a very good one. The students were not very active. He was also struck by the fact that some of them were obviously bored. The group leaders were also alarmed by this situation. They admitted that it was not easy to abandon the accustomed methods.

At that time an initiative was born in the political section--to prepare and conduct a seminar at which the best propagandists would exchange know-how with their colleagues and tell about the use of the specific-focus method in their practical work. The seminar was held soon thereafter. It took place in a

creative and interested atmosphere. Those who were experiencing difficulties in employing the specific-focus method were able to derive many useful and valuable things from the seminar. The talks presented by Lieutenant Colonel A. Kas'yanov and Major A. Dianov were the most interesting. They presented reports in which they summarized the experience accumulated by their groups in the comprehensive use of the specific-focus training techniques in the Marxist-Leninist training lectures, in seminar classes and in the students' independent work with original sources. The group leaders provided a great deal of interesting practical advice. The political section recommended that all propagandists make use of that advice.

The idea of making up a methodological aid as an experiment, in which the best propagandists would describe their experience, was also born at that time. It would have one objective--to help those leaders who still lacked adequate practical skills by summarizing everything positive in the training work. Officers Kas'yanov and Dianov were charged with writing up the aid. The veteran political workers, with active assistance from the political section, handled the assignment fairly well. The methods aid was written up and duplicated, and today all of the group leaders are using it successfully in their work. It can be said without exaggeration that the first test has been successful. The main thing is that an earnest, creative search is under way for reserves for enhancing effectiveness in the officers' Marxist-Leninist training. It must be acknowledged that the search is bearing fruit.

What conclusions did the authors of the aid reach? What, specifically, do they have to offer? One has to agree with their thesis, for example, that the specific-focus training results from an organic union of the lecture's scientific substance and its specific-focus methods. Furthermore, the lecture involves dealing with the main aspects of the subject, with its key theoretical principles, and an inseparable linkage with life, with the society's development and with the tasks being performed by the personnel.

The authors of the aid correctly point out that it is not enough simply to ask the officers questions. It is important for both the lecturer and the students to be simultaneously involved in the process of seeking the truth, seeking proof of the correctness of this or that tenet. What is the best way to accomplish this? How can the students be motivated to engage in active mental effort? Officers Kas'yanov and Dianov feel that in this case it is a good thing for the lecturer to ask the students to express their own opinion about the specific topic. There will ordinarily be several points of view. The students begin to wonder who is right, of course. This is where the ideological and theoretical competence and the force of logic of the instructor has the crucial role. He moves from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher level, as it were, and leads the students to determine the truth.

Experience has shown that the students are motivated to think and are drawn into an atmosphere of active creative search most frequently by those group leaders who carefully think over the substance and the formulation of the questions for the audience, take the officers' training level and the specific features of their service duties into account, and bring up for discussion those problems which exist for them in their daily work, which are involved in the fulfillment of their service duty. The aid points out that the officers can best be stimulated to take an active part by asking specific questions. For example, they

might be asked: "Why is it felt that the accomplishment of this task should begin in precisely this manner?"; "In your opinion what are the main causes of this?"; "What is the best way to resolve the problem?"; "On what grounds can we conclude that this theoretical tenet is correct?" and so forth. A skillfully raised question increases attention to the lecturer's talk. The students "get into" the thinking process, as it were, along with him. Experience has shown that this method results in a more thorough grasping of the training material and contributes to the effective shaping of convictions.

The adoption of the specific-focus training method inevitably also entails changes in the methods used by the students in their independent work with original sources. This is not a matter of increasing the size of the outline. Some group leaders see good work only in a thick outline by a student and do not thoroughly consider the substance of the notes. It is better for their students who write theses which are relatively short but which precisely answer specific questions such as the following. In what historical circumstances was the work produced? What were its objectives? What specific development have certain tenets of the Marxist classics undergone in the contemporary situation? How can these tenets be applied in the service work of the officers? This approach rules out the mechanical copying of information, and truly creative work moves to the fore.

I shall cite a specific experience in organizing independent training in the group led by Lieutenant Colonel S. Golovyuk. Prior to each seminar he gives the students special assignments in the form of questions pertaining to the substance of a specific original source. These are the kinds of questions the officer assigned the students, for example, when as part of one of their subjects they were studying V.I. Lenin's work "A Speech Delivered on 24 October 1919 to Sverdlovsk University Students Being Sent to the Front": "How is the linkage between the morale of the army and that of the people reflected in the leader's speech?", "What does the role of morale as a factor in a war consist of?", "How is the importance of the personal example set by the communists for the masses expressed?" and "Why did V.I. Lenin give special attention to the communists' ability to get close to the most backward Red Army men?"

As they perform such assignments, the students thoroughly think over the theoretical tenets of the original source, find the main ideas contained therein and correctly determine their linkage with the present, with the specific situation in the unit and in the area assigned to the officer. A study of seminar classes conducted in that group shows that this kind of work ordinarily leads to creative discussions, to substantive and interesting debate, and consequently, to a more thorough understanding of the theory of Marxist-Leninism by the students. The best proof of this is the fact that Lieutenant Colonel S. Golovyuk's group has been the best in the unit for a long time. It is only natural that all of the students are handling their service duties successfully. They are skillful organizers of the training process, experienced indoctrinators of the personnel and thoughtful propagandists.

The leaders of the officers' Marxist-Leninist training groups who use the specific-focus training method most productively ordinarily work out special procedures and means for each type of class--precis, research problems, questions, individual assignments and reports--and carefully prepare for the discussion. The leader devotes his efforts mainly to explaining to the students

the main ideas contained in the subject being studied and the more significant connections and patterns in the phenomena being considered. All of this helps to create so-called problem situations in the classes--that is, a situation which brings out most clearly the contrasts between the level of knowledge which the students possess and that which they need in order to fully grasp the problem and to understand the ways of resolving it by means of new knowledge. The vast majority of problem situations lead to debate. I shall illustrate this with the following example.

Colonel V. Sukharev, the group leader, was conducting a seminar class on the subject: "Lenin's Doctrine on the Party and its Development in CPSU Decisions." By carefully thinking over the questions, the propagandist was able to create a problem situation at the very beginning of the seminar. He asked the students: "Why did V.I. Lenin decide to create a new type of party in Russia and not take the course of creating worker parties like those functioning in the nations of Western Europe"?

Several students at once wanted to answer the question. Lieutenant Colonel A. Shul'shitskiy said that the Russian working class needed a party to reflect its interests, a party to serve as its advance fighter. The parties in Western Europe were opportunistic, however, and kowtowed to the elemental nature of the workers' movement.

Major P. Taranov added that the social democratic parties in the West had always taken reformist positions, opposed far-reaching socialist forms, not raised the issue of gaining political power and consequently, doomed the proletariat to eternal slavery.

Lieutenant Colonel A. Shadrin expressed the following point of view: V.I. Lenin dreamed of a revolutionary party guided by advanced theory, which the parties of Western Europe lacked. Without advanced scientific theory a party could not bring the proletariat up to the level necessary to understand the objectives of the class struggle against the bourgeoisie.

During the discussion the seminar leader gave every student the opportunity to express and defend his point of view. He then led the officers to a correct understanding of Lenin's doctrine on the new type of party, to the conclusion that only a party established on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles is capable of uniting and directing the class struggle of the proletariat and of assuring victory of the socialist revolution.

I have one objective in describing all of this in detail: This approach to the training, in my opinion, contains grains of experience which can be used and creatively developed for advancing toward the adoption of the specific-focus method. Experience has repeatedly demonstrated, after all, that when the leaders and the students take an interest in the classes, the classes become more attractive and a lively exchange of opinions becomes the standard and not the exception, which is what Guards Major V. Kuznetsov expressed regrets about in his letter.

I would also like to say this. Although we can consider that the superiority of the specific-focus method over the traditional method has been proven, it is doubtful that we will go any further with it if it does not receive proper attention from the political organs and party organizations. Their specific,

practical support for those propagandists who are seeking and thinking (albeit not always without error) provides wings for the new. The leaders of the Marxist-Leninist training groups in the unit in which Lieutenant Colonel S. Golovyuk serves, for example, cannot complain about a lack of attention on the part of the political organ and the party organizations to their work and their concerns. Just recently Lieutenant Colonels V. Bondarenko and V. Dovgal', group leaders, submitted reports in the political organ on their experience in using the specific-focus method. Following the reports the political section arranged for the propagandists to attend demonstration classes conducted by officers Bondarenko and Dovgal'. They shared their experience in using the specific-focus method with their colleagues. At the initiative of the political organ a demonstration class was held with a lecture using elements of the specific-focus method. It was presented by Colonel V. Sukharev, a veteran propagandist. With the political organ's support, the group leaders are naturally boldly engaging in experimentation and are involved in exploration. They willingly share their methodological finds with one another, follow the methodological literature on specific-focus training with great interest, and strive for an innovative approach to the training.

Such an approach is in keeping with the spirit of demands set forth at the June 1983 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which call upon the propagandists to be bolder in their use of the active training forms and to enhance the effectiveness of the political training. The political awareness of the officers and their service and public activeness are growing, and the personal contribution of each individual to the successful accomplishment of the combat and political training tasks and the tasks involved in the ideological indoctrination of the personnel is increasing as a result.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

LAX ATTITUDE TOWARD PARTY REFLECTED IN CARE OF DOCUMENTS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 7 Apr 84 (signed to press 16 Mar 84) pp 83-84

[Article: "Carefully Protect the Party Card"]

[Text] The communist's party card always reminds him of the duty of a party fighter, of his great obligations. This card, which confirms one's membership in the CPSU, reflects the party's faith in its members. Upon entering the ranks of the CPSU and receiving a party card, every communist is obligated to do everything possible to be worthy of the important title of member of the Lenin party.

Careful regard for the party card is one of the CPSU's traditions. And the party organizations cannot be indifferent about how the communists protect their party cards. The individual's treatment of the party card is one manifestation of his awareness and discipline, after all.

The CPSU Central Committee has repeatedly brought to the attention of the party organizations the need to constantly instill in the communists a sense of great responsibility for protecting their party cards. We must not forget that stolen or lost cards can be used both by our enemies and by criminal elements.

Most party organizations do a great deal to instill vigilance and a sense of party duty in the communists. Ways to increase the sense of responsibility for protecting party cards in the members and candidate members are discussed at meetings of the party committees and party buros. They are also discussed at party meetings. Individual work is performed. Every loss or theft of a party card is carefully investigated. As they discuss these matters, the party organs look not only at the circumstances surrounding the loss of the document and the degree of guilt of the communist himself, but also the situation, the state of discipline and indoctrinational work in the party organization in which it occurred. The proper conclusions are drawn from each such incident. Individuals guilty of negligence are strictly punished. Everything possible is done to prevent a repetition of such occurrences.

Unfortunately, however, we still have cases of the cards of party members and candidate members being lost or damaged. This occurs most frequently when the comrades are on leave or on temporary duty assignments. Party cards are frequently left unguarded in easily accessible places: in desks, nightstands,

briefcases and suitcases. They are sometimes lost in stores and hotels and while traveling. In some cases party cards fall into the hands of children due to carelessness; they are sometimes damaged as clothes are dry-cleaned, and so forth. Experience has shown that only in rare cases are there valid excuses for losses of or damage to the cards of party members or candidate members. The main cause in the specific instances is most frequently the same; a dulled sense of responsibility, lowered vigilance or carelessness.

There are instructions governing the way in which party cards are protected. Every communist is required to protect his own membership or candidate membership card, and is capable of doing so. He must protect them in a manner which eliminates any possibility of loss, theft or damage.

If a communist becomes ill and enters a hospital, the patient's card may be taken for safekeeping by the deputy hospital chief for political affairs or by the secretary of the party organization. In this case the party card is registered in a party log, and the owner signs for it when it is returned.

Some communists would like to turn in their party cards for safekeeping prior to tactical and field exercises. This is not right. The communists went into battle with their party cards next to their hearts, after all. It reminded them that they belonged to the great party and inspired them to accomplish feats. The communist should have his party card on him even in tactical exercises.

Many party organizations periodically check on the status of party cards. Some comrades feel that these inspections are an unnecessary formality. This is not true. It cannot be considered normal for a CPSU member to attend a meeting without his party card, for example. And it is certainly appropriate to check from time to time to see that the communists have their party cards. When the membership dues are paid, the secretary of the primary party organization can also inquire about how the comrade is protecting his party card, and if necessary, advise him on how to take care of the document.

We have already mentioned the fact that each theft or loss of a party card is thoroughly reviewed. It is important to carefully ascertain what caused the party card to be lost and to hold the guilty party strictly accountable. Certain party organizations take a liberal approach to the assessment of careless handling of party cards by the communists, however. Those individuals considering the personal cases of CPSU members and candidate members who have lost their party cards sometimes seek extenuating circumstances and attempt to downplay the individual's responsibility. It is doubtful that the discussion of the communist's infraction will serve as a good lesson for the other members of the party organization in such a case.

A sense of responsibility for the protection of party cards should be developed constantly, using the most diverse means for this possible. For example, those chiefs of political sections who advise new CPSU members on how they should care for their party cards when the cards are issued are doing the right thing. This

should also be pointed out to the communists when they go on leave or depart on a temporary duty assignment.

A periodic discussion of these matters in the party circle is a proven means of instilling in the party members and candidate members a sense of responsibility for the careful protection of party cards. In many party organizations it has become the rule to hold individual talks on the party card with comrades accepted into the CPSU. When matters of party development are discussed at seminars for secretaries of party organizations and at schools for young communists attention is also given to such subjects as the history of the party cards and V.I. Lenin's regard for the membership card.

It is a great honor to belong to the ranks of the Lenin party. And the party card attests to that honor. From the day the individual is issued the party card he should never lose his sense of personal responsibility for the party's affairs, for his own conduct and for the protection of the party card.

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ARMED FORCES

INEXPERIENCE, FORMALISM IN RELATIONS WITH SUBORDINATES HIT

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No. 7, Apr 84 (signed to press 16 Mar 84) pp 64-69

[Article by Maj V. Laptev, adjutant at the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin: "The Complexity of the Simple"]

[Text] It is a simple fact that indoctrinating an individual without having studied him is the same as treating a patient without having made a diagnosis. Everyone acknowledged this verbally, but what about in their actions? It is not a simple matter to see inside an individual. Sincerity and good will, knowledge and experience, patience and perspicacity are required. And the opposite--rushing to conclusions, superficial observations and haste--can only result in errors. The following is confirmation of this.

...The news that Sergeants S. Gafurov and L. Slovak had been AWOL and had been arrested by a patrol fell upon the training subunit with the unexpectedness of an avalanche. The men's direct superiors did not even believe it at first. "We watched them go from privates to sergeants... and now,"--they threw up their hands. "This cannot be." But the facts were irrefutable. Their disbelief was then replaced by embarrassment. "We didn't see it coming," they said in justification. "They speak the truth when they say that one cannot see into another person's soul."

But let us get away from the emotion. Let us take a look into the substance of the indoctrinational work performed in the subunit. Yes, the personnel were studied. But how were they studied? After forming an opinion of their subordinates at the very beginning, the commander and the other officers frequently considered that the job was completed. Relying upon themselves, they ignored the opinion of the collective. They became involved in mass activities and did not give proper attention to the individual indoctrinational work. We know that this results in the sacrifice of information on the situation in the collective.

This incident is certainly not typical, but it graphically illustrates something which is typical. Formalism in the study of people is unproductive and dangerous, because for a certain time it creates the illusion that all is well. This is why the aforementioned subunit was considered to be one of the best in the unit with respect to military discipline until "lightning struck."

This sort of inconsistency between how the personnel should be taught and how they are actually taught results in pedagogical failures. And one of the main causes is the inadequate psychological-pedagogical preparedness of the indoctrinators. Even the best of them bitterly acknowledge this.

Throughout his career Captain A. Musin has had a reputation as a skillful indoctrinator. Various officials have repeatedly described him as being capable, like no one else, of using the potential of subordinates by efficiently and perceptively revealing their merits and their shortcomings. It is therefore all the more surprising to hear the officer say that studying the personnel and maintaining proper relations with his subordinates involves the greatest difficulty for him. Precisely in these areas he has felt a deficiency of knowledge and skills, although military pedagogics and psychology were his favorite subjects in school. And just how was the experienced indoctrinator's prestige established? Captain Musin achieved it through trial and error.

Growing "pains" are inevitable, but Musin now believes that many of the difficulties could have been avoided. The officer is convinced that he would have achieved more in the indoctrination of the fightingmen at the beginning of their service, if he had possessed a greater store of practical knowledge and skills when he graduated from the school.

We could cite other such examples. Many commanders and political workers lack psychological and pedagogical training. This is especially true of the young officers, who bear the main burden of performing the individual work with soldiers and sergeants in the subunits.

Man's role in military affairs has now grown to the point that the slightest error in the assessment of the fightingman's qualities can have dangerous consequences. This is why it is essential to thoroughly study the personnel, and it is becoming more difficult to do so by the year. On the one hand, the human material with which the army indoctrinator deals is changing. "The young generation setting out on an independent life today is the most literate in the nation's entire history...", it was stated at the June 1983 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Some of the youth, however, are politically naive, and some of them exhibit lack of concern and passivity. More and more young people are entering the army right out of school, without acquiring adequate conditioning in the labor force or solid skills in getting things done. On the other hand, the improvement of the equipment and the weapons and the increase in the number of military specialities and of the demands made of the specialist's training have resulted in intensification and individualization of the training process.

This is objective reality. It urgently demands that the training and indoctrination be based on an individual approach. In some places, however, the infamous "gross" prevails in the indoctrinational work. We strive for quantity and large scale in the activities. We see them as a universal tool which can be used equally successfully to work fragile glass and viscous clay, rigid metal and soft wax.

Why is there a shortage of individual work? Certainly not because the amount of the work has been reduced. On the contrary, it has grown! But the demand

for it has grown even more rapidly. Especially subtle, individual work requires good organization, a thorough knowledge of each of the subordinates, and a constant influence upon them. It is difficult for one person, even an experienced indoctrinator, to carry such a load. A great deal depends upon the officer's personality and upon the situation in the collective. One individual will take the course of least resistance when he encounters difficulties; another will explore, try and experiment with things, and influence his comrades with his example. Such individuals include Captain V. Baygulov, deputy commander for political affairs in a training battalion. I believe that the instructive elements in his indoctrinational practices are worthy of attention.

Baygulov became interested in sociology while still at the military school. He attended classes in a scientific group and lectures at the university. Burning with a desire to apply the knowledge he had acquired as rapidly as possible, he made a study in his platoon. It was a failure. He did understand, however, that it is worth the effort to thoroughly master the methods for performing specific sociological studies. His involvement in this study at the school came in handy when he was a deputy company commander for political affairs. He was forced to turn to theory once again, however, when it became necessary to study the psychological characteristics of the fighting-men and to provide a social and psychological description of the military collective. His knowledge of specific sociology proved inadequate. But Baygulov began studying social psychology.

One should not look for revelations in Vladimir Yevgen'yevich's work. The techniques he uses are well known. Baygulov works more subtly, however.

How does the process of getting to know the new men ordinarily begin? With a study of questionnaires and with personal talks. Each responsible individual, from the sergeant to the subunit commander, considers it his duty to talk with a subordinate. According to the psychologists, the first impression is the strongest. This means that everything in that first talk is important: questions, behavior, the situation. Do those in charge think about this? Not always. A soldier is summoned to the company office for a "heart-to-heart" talk. He will be required to candidly answer a series of standard questions on his life. What kind of feelings can such a talk evoke, other than embarrassment or even hidden rebellion? Who likes to explain why he grew up without a father, for example?

It is Vladimir Baygulov's rule to first glean as much information as possible from the records, and only the minimum from the talk. He does not fish for information which the individual does not consider it necessary to provide voluntarily. "Everyone has a place in his heart, which he does not like to permit outsiders to enter. What person would not like to start from the beginning and write a new page in his life's history? And what is concealed will become known with time in any case."

Captain Baygulov receives most of his information on new men during their first month in the unit. The most confidential information he obtains during the first week. During that period the young soldier is full of impressions. He needs to tell someone what is on his mind, to get advice, sympathy and help.

To whom does he turn? To his comrades? He still has none at this point. And if he has, they have still not acquired prestige in his eyes. An officer or a sergeant is a different matter.

"During that period I ask the commanders not to be overly official or try to use their authority, but to exercise as much tact, patience and goodwill as possible. Can we afford to pass up an opportunity for a heart-to-heart talk with a soldier? A frank conversation is only possible when both parties are tuned to the wavelength of mutual interests. A mandatory question evokes the same sort of answer. Before bringing up a question of interest to me, I talk about what interests the soldier. About his thoughts on the harvest, on hockey, on the weather, on new things in science and technology. I reflect, indicate doubts and ask for advice. The soldier then begins to speak on his own, and I only direct the conversation into the necessary channel."

Baygulov never writes down what has been discussed or his observations in the presence of the soldier. One cannot remember everything, however, and the officer therefore makes notes later, while the impressions are still fresh. Other officers and sergeants accumulate information in the same way. All of the information is periodically systematized.

Correspondence with the parents is a source of useful information about the fightingmen's state of health and features of their character. Baygulov has calculated that up to 15 percent of the letters provide new information. The conduct of one of the soldiers (I shall not mention his name, since he is still in the service) evoked the most contradictory opinions. He was extremely introverted and passive, and he tried to keep to himself. Some accused him of egotism, others of laziness. "He knows what he is doing," others maintained. The doubts were dispelled by a letter from his mother. It was learned that the young man had seen his father die in a burning house just before his induction into the army. The son had been constantly tortured by a sense of guilt for not having been able to save his father. The letter forced people to reconsider their attitude toward the soldier.

Various methods are used for studying the personnel in the subunit. Observation is the main method. It is performed constantly: during the drills, during guard duty, at meetings, in the classroom, in the field and in the motor vehicle pool. Special attention is given to their behavior in difficult situations.

"A Private Batazhar Sultanov served in our outfit," Captain Baygulov recalls. "He was modest to the point of shyness and quiet to the point of going unnoticed. We had a tactical exercise. The company was to attack in a difficult situation. I will not deny the fact that I feared for Sultanov: Would he make it through the exercise?"

"We deployed for the attack. The officers were in front, the soldiers behind them. A salvo of gunfire came with a bang, followed immediately by an explosion. I watched the soldiers instinctively stoop down and slow their pace. How did Sultanov react? He moved on, standing straight, and encouraged his comrades! He could be counted on. Sultanov subsequently confirmed this many times. He became the best section commander."

You cannot get to know an individual once and for all. Like trees, people grow all their lives. Unfortunately, however, they do not always grow straight. It is dangerous to rely exclusively upon one's own standpoint for evaluating an individual. This carries the risk of overlooking a crooked spot. You need to look at the individual from the side, and from various sides.

...This happened in the Transbaykal, in the wintertime. Baygulov had taken his company to the field. It was an ordinary exercise. They made a march over a steppe leveled off by snowstorms, and set up a strongpoint. They chopped the frozen earth until their hands were shaking. They had dug in by the designated time, but the soldiers were staggering from fatigue. And the main task lay ahead--the repelling of a night attack.

The deputy commander for political affairs assembled the aktiv: "We have to rouse the men. Remind them of the international situation, of the unit traditions. Help the weak ones. Sing and joke with them. Work like the devil, but there must be no drooping spirits in our ranks."

Small fires were built on the bottom of a protected trench. The faces of the soldiers brightened. Only in the third platoon was morale not affected, a platoon in which the agitator was a soldier upon whom the deputy commander for political affairs greatly counted. His efficiency, his knowledge and eloquence were cited as an example for others. What was the matter?

"I began mentally analyzing his behavior, and I recalled this detail. Immediately after the talk the soldiers had dispersed, leaving the agitator alone. Why had they done so? I decided to keep an eye on him. And what did I observe? When a break was announced, he was the first to rush to a fire. He seated himself there and did not give up his place until the break was over. It is easier, it seems, for some people to make a fiery speech on love for mankind than to share warmth with a comrade."

The first phase in the study of personnel in the subunit is completed by the end of the month. A personal record is put together for each soldier. It represents the collective opinion of the individual. Along with biographical information, it contains information on the serviceman's character, his temperament, his intellectual and volitional qualities, his interests, his main motivations and his level of discipline. Soldiers requiring special attention are placed into a special group: those with poor health, those who do not know the Russian language well, and those who are inclined to violate discipline.

I had confirmed my opinion that Baygulov knows his subordinates well, when I heard the following: "Did you know that he has repeatedly been criticized for delaying the selection of personnel for the aktiv?"

"Yes, we deliberately begin the selection process somewhat later than the others" Vladimir Yevgen'yevich said in confirmation. "From what I have observed around half of the activists in the newly formed collectives do not cope with their duties. And why not? The Komsomol members do not have time

to find out who is who. They ordinarily select the most sociable and communicative individuals. In addition, they observe the requirements which they applied to the aktiv prior to entering the army. But those requirements are greater and of somewhat different substance in the army. This is why we do not hurry, but try to check out as many candidates as possible on the practical level. We lose time, but we gain quality."

Two or two and a half months after the new men arrive Captain Baygulov begins working with microgroups. The word "microgroup" has a purely negative connotation for certain officers. They see all sorts of things in it: a source of lack of discipline, a breeding ground for nonregulation relations, a threat to the collective's unity....

The microgroup is an objective development, however. It cannot be eliminated, but it can be used. Microgroups with a positive orientation are unquestionably beneficial. Welded into the monolith of the collective, they give it solidity, like the grains of quartz in granite.

The first thing Vladimir Yevgen'yevich does is to define the makeup of the microgroups and their orientation. This sounds like a simple and rapid process. "It is my task to determine who has ties with whom. I watch to see whom a soldier is most frequently with in the classes, while resting and in the mess-hall. I learn whom he consults, whom he helps and whom he defends in a conflict. I conduct a survey to find out who wants to be together with whom in the so-called combat 'trios.' I ask the officers, the sergeants and the activists for their opinion. I then make a diagram. I designate the fightingmen with little circles and indicate their ties with arrows. I then identify the leaders of the microgroups. That is not hard to do. It is more difficult to understand what unites the people and which values they hold higher, collective or group. There are many instances in life in which the individual is faced with the choice of whether to give priority to the interests of the collective or those of the group. Such situations help determine the popularity of the microgroups."

Finally, there is the most difficult part of the process--to give the proper orientation to the microgroups which take shape. The prime concern here is to indicate to the young soldiers whom they should emulate. If you can see that one of the soldiers is having a negative influence upon his colleagues, immediate steps should be taken to eliminate the influence. I shall use an example to illustrate how Baygulov does this. At one time the collective was concerned about a "foursome" consisting of Privates Dzgoyev, Knysh, Kazaryan and Radchuk. It accounted for the lion's share of the infractions of discipline. Dzgoyev, leader of the foursome, would use any excuse to argue with the commanders. Nor were the soldiers outstanding in the training.

What accounted for Dzgoyev's domination? His physical strength, his developed will, his extreme vanity and ostentation. Not wanting to achieve prestige with painstaking, persistent work, Dzgoyev selected a different way. He decided to acquire a reputation as an individual of independent views and varying opinions. He criticized the shortcomings and pointed out the errors of those in charge and questioned their decisions. When he would go too far, he would act as though he were being picked on: He was not doing it for himself, he would try to make it seem.

The other soldiers had to be freed Dzgoyev's influence. Contacts among members of the microgroup were quietly limited: They were no longer assigned to the same detail or the same job and no longer carried out public assignments together. The weak spot in the "foursome" was identified. It was Private Radchuk. He was a friend of Private Mironyuk, a good soldier in every respect. Radchuk was put on the same crew with Mironyuk. Private Mironyuk helped to take his buddy out from under Dzgoyev's influence. As a result of the relationship between Mironyuk and Radchuk, Private Knysh also changed his behavior. His interest in the equipment was used for this purpose. This was an area in which Dzgoyev was weak. The fightingmen gradually began to notice Private Dzgoyev's egotistical nature. Baygulov could see that it was time to take resolute action. "It is a rule of mine never to begin discussing a soldier's conduct until those around him have developed the correct attitude toward him. The opinion of the microgroup, with its unofficial relationships, is frequently the determining factor for an individual, especially where the collective is just taking shape." Baygulov had chosen the right time. Finding himself without support, Dzgoyev was forced to change his behavior.

Frequent turnover of the personnel is a distinguishing feature of the military collective in a training subunit. They are practically all replaced every 6 months. We have to start all over again. "Starting all over again does not mean starting with nothing," Baygulov explains. "We still have the experience we have acquired and the traditions."

Baygulov feels that every company should have its history, recorded in documents and exhibits. Reports on the collective's achievements, the experience of the best fightingmen and their photographs, articles about them published in the press, and send-off ceremonies for young comrades released into the reserve--all of these things are carefully preserved in the subunit. And that which appears to be of little significance today acquires importance and meaning in time. The soldier knows whose performance he should emulate and from whom to take his example. He knows that the memory of him and of his deeds will remain in the subunit, and he tries to make it a good memory.

Any job is only as good as its results. What are the fruits of Captain Baygulov's indoctrinational work? They are to be found in the future of the people involved. The entire company recently read a letter from Private (Reserve) Mikhail Zhabin. The deputy commander for political affairs did not have an easy time with him. He was hotheaded and went to the extreme in his actions. In the language of athletes, he was close to fouling in everything he did in the service. His leave-taking with his comrades had been a cool one. Now he wrote that people had not recognized him at home. He had matured, they said. Baygulov met Privates V. Treskin and I. Mamedov, his former trainees, while on temporary duty assignment. He was pleased with their success. He recalled how difficult it had been to involve them in public life. He had seen capabilities in them, which the soldiers themselves had not felt. He had also detected the makings of commanders in Privates A. Emeksuzyan and A. Mukhin. The former is now a sergeant, the latter a warrant officer.

The results of Captain Baygulov's pedagogical efforts are to be found in the solidarity of the military collective and in the combat training of his subordinates. His experience has been summarized in the unit, and some of the officers use his recommendations in their practical work. They include comrades

A. Rassokha, M. Ovchinnikov and M. Glukhovskiy. Captain A. Yakovlev is using Baygulov's methods in another district. And so, his good initiative is receiving support. Unfortunately, however, not from all the indoctrinators. There are also those who regard the enterprising political worker's work style and methods as an additional burden, however, or even as a useless undertaking. Baygulov himself talked about this bitterly: "We had completed the training in the subunit. Some officers from line units visited us. I offered one of them the accumulated result of our study of each fightingman. He looked at them and... declined: They had no need for such details."

Fortunately, not many are like that. But let us not delude ourselves--the experience of others is not a panacea. It is only a means of arriving at our own opinion. The foundation for the officer's pedagogic skill is laid at the VUZ. Since we consider the school graduate to be prepared to work on his own, he should be able to work with people. Unfortunately, the student deals more with the textbook at the school than with the life of a combat subunit, with its personnel. Furthermore, it will be a long time before he will be applying the knowledge he has acquired in his study of military pedagogics and psychology in his practical work. A body of knowledge which will just be dead weight for some time can hardly evoke enthusiasm in the students. What is the solution? The solution lies in linking theory and practice more closely in the training process itself. The portion of practical classes is being increased, the processes which occur in the military collectives are modeled in the classes, and life's typical situations are practiced at the military educational institutions for this purpose. The student therefore learns not only what to do and how to do it, but also learns to do it.

It can still not be said, however, that there are no barriers to the introduction of theory into praxis anywhere. Far from all the military VUZ's have the collection of problems in military pedagogics and psychology. Classes in which the trainees take the role of indoctrinators are being introduced into the training process hesitantly. When the students leave for practical training and OJT in the forces, they are not always given an assignment in military pedagogics and psychology.

We might think about whether that passion for mass undertakings to the detriment of individual work begins at the school. We most frequently teach the cadet how to set up a class, a meeting, an evening gathering and the competition. In short, we teach them how to conduct an activity. We believe that he can learn on his own how to get close to an individual, however, how to understand and help the individual. We asked Captain Musin what he brought with him to the unit after graduating from the school. "Primarily various work plans, plans for various activities and instructions on methods for conducting classes," the officer replied. Far less frequently does the graduate have specific psychological and pedagogical recommendations for studying the personnel and selecting them for jobs, for uniting the military collective and preventing conflicts, or methods for studying military discipline. And so the officer has to acquire on his own that which the school could have given him.

People say that experience is an acquired thing, that it comes with the years. And it does, but by that time the officer is leaving the company. Every indoctrinator today needs experience, so that not a single soul in the subunit is

left in obscurity. The soul of the Soviet soldier is in no way alien. He is a comrade in arms. The adoption of scientific recommendations and advanced know-how in the work is designed for just that, to permit the young officer to rapidly acquire pedagogical acuity. The time has obviously arrived for us to establish a unified system for the psychological and pedagogical study of the personnel. It should involve all subunit commanders and political workers and should include the compilation of a psychological profile of each soldier. In order to do this we will have to work out the proper methods, and all of the officers will have to learn them. This is a lot of work, but it is justified. Far more effort is spent correcting pedagogical errors, completing the training and re-indoctrinating.

The human being has been and continues to be the main force in our army. There can be no successes and no victories without him. And the officer's indoctrinational work cannot be successful unless he knows his subordinates. This is a fact which obligates every officer to put everything he has into working with the people, to work with truly creative enthusiasm.

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ARMED FORCES

LETTERS TO KRASNAYA ZVEZDA EDITOR, RESPONSES

Military Labor Improperly Used

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jun 84 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank A. Zlydnev: "After A Warning"]

[Text] Last October 11, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published a critical report, "Summer Country Homes Willy-Nilly." It discussed the fact that the personnel of one of the subunits are systematically used for work in various organizations of the city: take care of the country plots of the commander's friends, and tidy up rooms in the hotel.... And all this during hours allotted for lessons. In answering the editors, the unit commander and the chief of the political department confirmed the reliability of the facts presented by the newspaper and reported that Major B. Pavlyuk had been disciplined and made answerable to the party. The garrison military prosecutor warned the officer of the impermissibility of violations of the law. This, it appeared, should be the reaction to the criticism.

But then the editors received a new letter from the subunit. Its author was Senior Lieutenant V. Lenchevskiy who was mentioned in the material of "Summer Country Homes Willy-Nilly." At one time, it was he who informed the editors of soldiers being sent to perform "seasonal work."

Lenchevskiy himself, let us say directly, is not distinguished by exemplary performance of duty. He has more than enough punishments. One of them, as the officer reported in the letter, appeared after the report "Summer Country Homes Willy-Nilly."

Once, they sent out from the subunit equipment which was in temporary storage. Prior to dispatch, it was learned that the engines of two machines were defective. Because of whose negligence was the water not drained from the cooling system in the winter? Guilt in this was put down to those who accompanied the equipment to the station of destination. Claims against the subunit were dismissed.

And then, three months later, Major Pavlyuk decided to establish the "true" culprit in what had happened. He was helped in doing this by a commission headed by Captain V. Urayev which conducted an administrative investigation.

Senior Lieutenant Lenchevskiy was adjudged guilty and twice his pay and allowances were withheld.

Just when did the damage to the engines occur? The administrative investigation did not provide an unambiguous answer. Studying the problem while the scent was hot, the commission member for the acceptance of equipment, Captain A. Bashkirtsev, mathematically substantiated the possibility of "thawing out" in the freight yard of the railroad station. Why weren't his calculations taken into consideration?

"I am a military person," Captain Urayev explains. "I conducted the investigation as I was ordered to do it...."

A strange position. Nor does it seem to be convincing to Major Pavlyuk. Boris Konstantinovich uses other proof: he asserts that anything can be expected from Senior Lieutenant Lenchevskiy. He paints the subordinate's service portrait in solid black. And at the same time he also reproaches the newspaper for unobjectivity.

I remind the one with whom I am speaking about the official, extremely authoritative answers which the editors received. I define more exactly whether the critical report was discussed by the subunit's communists.

"They met and discussed it," says Major Pavlyuk.

"It would appear that no meeting took place then," the secretary of the party organization, Captain V. Tsikozin, does not agree. "I don't remember it. By the way, Captain Urayev will clear it up. He was secretary at that time."

"There was a meeting," Captain Urayev reiterates. "At that time, it was limited to a conversation."

"Is this reflected in the minutes?"

"They kept rough records. Now they can't be found."

When I told about this talk in the political department, they were amazed there. They believed that a meeting had taken place, and a talk based on principle had been conducted, and they reported to the editors concerning the rebuke allegedly given to communist B. Pavlyuk, having no doubts.

Yes, the senior commanders hastened to answer in writing, thus having done nothing to improve the moral atmosphere in the subunit. And it had a great need for improvement. Why, let us say, did the service of the young officers--Senior Lieutenants N. Kornoushenko, S. Kuzin, and the above-mentioned V. Lenchevskiy--not take shape in a comparatively small collective? Were they engaged in their education?

"I don't have to nurse anyone," believes Major Pavlyuk. "I have too much other important work."

It cannot be denied: a strange position.

I will not assert that the subunit accomplishes easy tasks. The rhythm of its life is rather strained. But can the following facts be explained in some way: the sergeants and soldiers with whom I spoke just did not remember when a Komsomol meeting took place. I was unable to learn who remained as secretary of the Komsomol organization for the one who had gone on leave.

Leaving the subunit, I saw a motor vehicle with a city license number at the gate. One of Major Pavlyuk's friends had arrived for the "work force." This time they refused the requestor. The presence of a correspondent embarrassed the commander....

Technician Training at Airfield Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jun 34 p 2

[Article by Maj V. Trofimov, Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "The Airfield Is the Classroom"]

[Text] Dear Editors! In the letter, "When Equipment Is Studied," which was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 31 March, my attention was attracted by the lines: "Thus, here the aviation specialists have the opportunity to study directly at the work sites--in the servicing groups." I should like to read in the newspaper how lessons are organized specifically with technicians at the airfield and which forms and methods provide the greatest effect.

Guards Senior Lieutenant Yu. Kulikov,
Aircraft Technician

The deputy commander of an excellent squadron for Air Force Engineer Service, Major V. Trofimov, answers our reader's question.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War proved the high effectiveness of lessons with the technical personnel at the airfield. I do not judge this from hearsay. Over a period of 10 years, I have had the occasion to work under the direction of the squadron engineer (this is what the post was formerly called) Major Vladimir Grigor'yevich Kovtun who performed these troublesome and important duties during the entire war at frontline airfields. He taught us in a practical manner how each minute of the working day should be used at the airfield with a high return. I now employ many procedures for the organization of lessons from the methodological arsenal of officer Kovtun when training technicians and mechanics. The results are shown by the fact that two thirds of the airplanes in the squadron are excellent.

We began by creating at the airfield a classroom in which diagrams of the most complex aircraft systems were hung. It never stands empty. Often all squadron technical personnel study in it, and at times the servicing group, flight, or part of a crew. With the halting of flights because of a sudden complication of weather conditions, lessons are usually conducted with all officer technicians. In this case, one of the group chiefs or TECH [technical maintenance unit] chiefs of the flight or one of the most experienced aircraft technicians presents papers, the subjects of which were determined ahead of time.

A considerable portion of the papers are made up, as a rule, from the personal experience of specialists and from procedures for the rapid and quality servicing of aviation equipment which have justified themselves in practice.

It often happens that a crew took off on a flight and some of the technicians and mechanics have the opportunity to do some work during the time remaining until the combat aircraft lands. In such a case, lessons in the classroom are organized by the most experienced chief of the flight TECH, Captain P. Yurochkin.

Recently, the squadron received two young flyers as replacements--Lieutenants N. Grinenko and V. Neverov--who formerly worked in civil aviation but decided to become regular officers. In a short time, they studied the aircraft servicing organization and technology and received permission to work independently. The rapid and quality placement of the young technicians into service was furthered by the painstaking instructional activity of Captains M. Mikolutskiy and V. Makarenko. Under their direction, Neverov and Grinenko performed the entire cycle of operations in preparing an airplane for flight at the airfield.

We also conduct lessons directly on the airplane in the course of aircraft maintenance day. Usually, each service chief organizes technical training with the aviators based on their specialty. Here, as a rule, regular operations on servicing aviation equipment are worked out. Both young technicians and masters participate in the training. It is not out of place for the latter to repeat the technological cycle in detail once again, and it is useful for the lieutenants to see how their senior comrade operates. The technical training is often supplemented by a special purpose inspection of the aircraft where special attention is concentrated on some assembly, mechanism, or system.

At times, it becomes necessary to replace an engine or other mechanism which has exhausted its established service life. This is the most convenient case for training the specialists! For example, recently almost all the officer-technicians were present during the replacement of an aircraft engine by Captain Makarenko, and each of them, helping the master, adopted something useful for himself.

It is important to teach the aviators to prevent the failures of aviation equipment. Preventive work permits the early disclosure of signs of possible malfunction and the prevention of a precondition for a flight accident. One day, Lieutenant V. Neverov turned attention toward overstated readings of the fuel-level indicator. As was learned during an in-depth inspection, the reason for this deviation from the standard was the landing of moisture in the plug-type connector. The decision was adopted to inspect the plug-type connectors on all other aircraft of the squadron. This was a graphic lesson in technical style for all technical personnel.

It is no secret that when servicing aviation equipment some specialists sometimes commit errors. They should not be kept a secret from their fellow servicemen. On the contrary, they all should know about them and necessary measures should be adopted for their prevention. Once aircraft technician Senior Lieutenant V. Nepomyashchiy incorrectly connected one of the hoses when installing an altimeter. The carelessness was discovered during a check inspection. The technician's error was analyzed profoundly and comprehensively in the course of a technical critique. This is also one of the forms of training.

The overwhelming majority of the forms and methods for training aviation specialists at the airfield which have been adjusted by frontline experience and the practice of daily activity are recommended by the guidance documents. It is only necessary to accomplish the requirements of the instructions and manuals punctually. But at the same time, everything new and advanced should be noted and implemented. Such a combined approach to the organization of the training process also provides the opportunity to achieve the best result.

Negligent Vehicle Personnel Punished

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jun 84 p 2

[Article: "Demand With All Severity"]

[Text] The letter by Major V. Ulovichenko was published under this heading [Demand With All Severity] on 15 May. It told about shortcomings in the use of motor transport belonging to a number of units and organizations of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet. As reported to the editors by the secretary of party committee of the base for motor transport and mechanization, G. Krivosheyev, the facts presented in the letter occurred. The newspaper's article was discussed in the collectives of the mechanized columns. For mismanagement which was permitted, the chief of a mechanized column, B. Burakov, was released and driver A. Nimas was transferred to the post of motor mechanic for 12 months.

Political Indoctrination Shortcomings Eliminated

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jul 84 p 2

[Article: "News from the Motherland"]

[Text] This was the title of a report by Captain 3d Rank A. Tkachev [News From the Motherland] published by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA this 1 June. It discussed shortcomings in operating the ship's general announcing system and the organization of political information sessions of personnel on the antisubmarine warfare cruiser "Leningrad" under the conditions of a long cruise.

The editors have received an official reply signed by the chief of the propaganda and agitation department--the deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Black Sea Fleet, Captain 1st Rank V. Cherepok. He informs us of the measures which have been adopted to eliminate the shortcomings which have been noted. Communists propagandist of the cruiser "Leningrad" Captain Lieutenant Yu. Krivenko and the commander of the signal division, Senior Lieutenant S. Ivanov, were heard at a session of the cruiser's party committee and their omissions in their work were strictly pointed out to them.

The report was studied in the fleet's political directorate and in the headquarters and political departments of the forces. Briefings were conducted with the flag's communication officers and the commanders of the signal departments on the ships of the forces. The requirements of the guidance documents concerning the procedure for the reception of political information were studied with political personnel of the ship element. Measures were adopted to organize the clear operation of ships' general-announcing centers, their work schedules were

corrected, and the monitoring of the activity of the officials responsible for ensuring the reception and use of political information at sea with the use of radio equipment was intensified.

Academy Selectees' Nomination Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jul 84 p 2

[Article: "Around the Finger"]

[Text] A critical report by Lieutenant Colonel A. Polyakov was published under this heading [Around the Finger] in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 24 March, discussing the irresponsible attitude of a number of officials of the Central Group of Forces toward the selection of candidates for entry into the academies, as a result of which Major V. Lukanyuk, who had received strict party punishment, was allowed to take the entrance examinations and then was enrolled as a student in the Military-Engineering Academy imeni V. V. Kuybyshev.

In their reply, which was received by the editors after a long delay, the chief of Engineer Troops of the Central Group of Forces, Major General A. Kolesnikov, and the secretary of the party organization of the group's Department of Engineer Troops, Lieutenant Colonel V. Polishchuk, reported that the report had been thoroughly discussed at a party meeting. Measures have been elaborated which are directed toward raising exactingness when recommending officers for entry in higher military educational institutions. Here, attention has been turned to the necessity to listen attentively to the opinion of the units' party organizations.

In the response of Colonel V. Bychkov, it says that for unscrupulousness and neglect in the performance of their official duties Lieutenant Colonel A. Kozich and the commander of a combat engineer battalion, Major Ye. Bobkov, received party and official punishment.

The editors also received a reply from the Chief of the Political Department of the Military Engineering Academy imeni V.V. Kuybyshev, Major General I. Komlev. He reported that the academy command and political department support completely the newspaper's position and share the critical evaluation of the facts presented in the report "Around the Finger." In particular, the response says that Major Lukanyuk's chiefs described this officer only from the positive aspect, persistently recommended him for acceptance in the academy, and concealed instances of Major Lukanyuk's unworthy behavior from the travelling acceptance commission of the Main Personnel Directorate of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. On the basis of an order by the Chief of Engineer Troops of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, Marshal of Engineer Troops S. Aganov, Major V. Lukanyuk was dropped from the academy rolls.

The content and conclusions from the report were discussed with the academy's supervisory personnel. Additional measures have been determined to raise demandingness when selecting candidates for acceptance in the academy and for the profound and comprehensive study of their moral-political and professional qualities.

Illegal Logging Brings Punishment

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Jul 84 p 2

[Article: "Comprehending the Truth"]

[Text] The short article by Colonel A. Drovosekov which was published under this heading [Comprehending the Truth] on 24 April told about the leaders of military construction organizations, Colonels A. Makarov and A. Sinyavskiy, who cut down a forest without logging permits. For losses caused the state, the organizations which they head were fined.

As reported to the editors by Lieutenant General N. Gryaznov, the newspaper article was discussed with the supervisory personnel of the Military Construction Directorate. For the illegal cutting of the forest CPSU member A. Makarov received a strict reprimand with an entry in his record card. Taking into consideration the fact that Col A. Sinyavskiy had issued the order to cut down the forest on the basis of the document signed by the customer, they decided to limit his punishment to disciplinary measures.

In the report of the military prosecutor of the Moscow Military District, Major General of Justice V. Kuznetsov, it says that in accordance with the facts presented in the article a check was conducted. It was established that the representative of the customer, Lieutenant Colonel A. Pashkov, was guilty of the illegal cutting of the forest in addition to Comrades Makarov and Sinyavskiy. For failure to provide the contract organizations with logging permits he was made answerable for it to the party and held disciplinarily responsible. In connection with the violation of forestry legislation, he was given a warning by the military prosecutor.

Civil Defense Competition Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jul 84 p 2

[Letter to editors by F. Kondrat'yev: "Not For Parades"]

[Text] I work as the Civil Defense chief of staff in the "Tikhiy don" sovkhov [state farm]. Recently, a competition of voluntary aid detachments of eight sovkhovs took place in our Sholokhovskiy rayon. Our sovkhov fielded a detachment consisting of 28 girls-- young agricultural production specialists.

The competition proceeded as follows. At the beginning, the members of the voluntary aid detachments passed in front of the judge in formation wearing pretty parade costumes. The judge--an officer from the military commissariat--awarded points to each detachment for drill training. After this, the detachment members once more passed in front of the judge--this time with a marching song. And points were awarded again.

After the parade march, each detachment was given the opportunity to present two or three amateur talent numbers. This time the judge was a female worker from the rayon Palace of Culture. There was also an inspection of visual agitation.

The first part of the competition lasted for three hours, and the members of the volunteer aid detachment still did not engage in their basic work--giving first aid to "victims."

Finally, the time came for the girls to operate in "stricken" areas. Here the detachment of our sovkhos proved to be the best trained, but it was not the winner: it lost points during the parade and at the concert.

And so I, an artilleryman who went through the entire Great Patriotic War, fell to thinking: should competitions of civil defense formations be conducted in this manner? Is it worth it for the sovkhos to spend 1,500 rubles on parade costumes for the members of the voluntary aid detachments?

In my opinion both the time and resources (and they are considerable) should be used primarily for the special training of the voluntary aid detachments and we should be concerned that the girls are able to use protective clothing and gas masks and to render aid to the population quickly and clearly. The winners should be heralded for practical actions, avoiding unnecessary showiness and ballyhoo.

Medical Care To Be Improved

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jul 84 p 2

[Article: "They Offended a Veteran"]

[Text] This [They Offended a Veteran] was the title of a letter to the editors by Senior Warrant Officer [praporshchik] N. Chernyshev which was published this 13 January. It discussed the rude and inattentive attitude of some physicians of the 113d Polyclinic, Frunzenskiy Rayon, Moscow, toward war veteran M. Sheykin.

A month after the letter's publication a reply reached the editors from the Department of Public Health, Frunzenskiy Rayon, signed by the chief of the department, Ye. Klyuyeva. It reported that the facts had been confirmed. However, there was not a word about who was punished and what measures had been adopted in the reply. Only three months after publication of the letter did a reply arrive from the polyclinic. It expressed regret that the newspaper had published the letter "without first acquainting the polyclinic's administration and the Department of Public Health." It reported that L. Toropova is "an exceptionally attentive doctor" and V. Samoylik is a "fully qualified doctor." But the letter discussed something else: The specific instance of violation of doctors' ethics and the rude treatment of the combat veteran.

In publishing the reply, the editors expressed the hope that the Frunzenskiy Rayon party committee will give the proper evaluation to instances of a formal attitude toward the newspaper's critical article.

As reported to us by the secretary of the Frunzenskiy Rayon party committee, N. Yakovleva, the questions raised in the article were considered jointly with the executive committee of the rayon soviet. It was established that the instances of an inattentive attitude toward war veteran M. Sheykin on the part of polyclinic physicians L. Toropova and V. Samoylik actually took place. The

letter was discussed in the polyclinic collective. The named doctors were reprimanded. For shortcomings in indoctrinational work the chief surgeon of the polyclinic, V. Brodskaya, was rebuked. The chief of the rayon Department of Public Health, Ye. Klyuyeva, was shown the necessity for a principled reaction to the press' critical articles.

Now documents necessary for the receipt of accommodations for sanatorium-resort treatment are being prepared for war veteran M. Sheykin.

Training Base Improved

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Jul 84 p 2

[Article: "Degree of Readiness"]

[Text] This [Degree of Readiness] was the title of a report by Lieutenant Colonel P. Chernenko which was published on 25 May. It told about shortcomings in the preparation of the training-material base for the summer training period in one of the training centers of the Far East Military District.

As reported to the editors by the commander of the large unit, the critical remarks were acknowledged as correct and timely. The newspaper's article was discussed at a service conference of officers. Lieutenant Colonel V. Istratov and Majors A. Gorbovskiy and S. Kopytkov, who did not ensure the readiness of the material-technical base, were held officially responsible.

To eliminate the shortcomings in the training center's equipment, additional resources and materials were allocated.

Post Exchange Officials Disciplined

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jul 84 p 2

[Article: "Under One Roof"]

[Text] A second reply was received to the report by Colonel A. Drovosekov which was published under this title [Under One Roof] on 12 May. The chief of the Rear Services Political Department of the Siberian Military District, Colonel I. Podol'nikov, reported that the newspaper's article was discussed with personnel of the Trade Directorate and with all chiefs of the district's post exchanges. The order of the district's deputy commander for rear services and chief of the district rear area was issued. It gave a severe reprimand to the district chief of the Trade Directorate, Colonel Yu. Kamdin, and his deputy for political affairs, Lieutenant Colonel B. Pestryakov. They were also made answerable to the party.

Military Hunting Official Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jul p 2

[Article: "There Will Be Objections!"]

[Text] This [There Will Be Objections] was the title of the letter to the editors by Major S. Bogomolov which was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA this April 11.

It reported on shortcomings in the work of the council of the military hunting society of the Central Group of Forces and on violations in the course of preparation and the conduct of a conference of the Group's military hunting societies.

As reported to the editors by the temporary acting chief of the political department of the headquarters and directorates of the Central Group of Forces, Colonel N. Osipov, the chairman of the Group's military hunting society council, Lieutenant Colonel R. Mokeyev, did not display proper responsibility toward preparations for the conference. He fully recognized the shortcomings in its conduct.

At the party meeting of the organization in which communist R. Mokeyev is registered, his report on his accomplishment of his party and official duty was heard. His superficial attitude toward the preparation and conduct of the conference was pointed out to him and it was recommended to him that he solve in a more principled manner questions connected with the accomplishment of planned measures and the rendering of assistance to councils of military hunters locally and that he make their work more active.

Officer's Efficiency Report Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jul 84 p 2

[Letter to the editor by Maj V. Borisov, Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "A Line in the Efficiency Report"]

[Text] Dear Editors! I want to share some of my thoughts concerning one miss in the advancement of an officer to a higher post.

Some time ago, Major P. Dikiy summed up his year-and-a-half activity in the post of commander of a signal battalion with a request to the unit commander: "I request your intercession concerning my transfer to a post with a lesser volume of work." In other words, Major Dikiy acknowledged that he was not equal to the official load of a battalion commander.

In the course of a check of the equipment's condition in the subunit entrusted to Major Dikiy, many serious shortcomings were disclosed. In addition, instances of gross violation of the rules for guard duty, military discipline, observance of the daily schedule, and other shortcomings were disclosed here.

The experience of the leading officers teaches us that a rise in the combat readiness of the subunit and the strengthening of the collective's solidarity are attained using the commander's skillful reliance on his deputies and party and Komsomol organizations. The role of his personal example in the accomplishment of the regulations' requirements is also great.

Major Dikiy did not have enough of this ability and these qualities. In addition, he was distinguished by an impetuous and hot-tempered nature and a lack of desire to establish firm ties with his fellow-servicemen, to gain the favor of people, and create an atmosphere of good will. Major Dikiy frequently replaced prescribed demandingness with rudeness and strictness--petty fault-finding. I will only present some lines which characterize the working style of this officer.

One day, during a marching drill review, noting that the service cap of one of the warrant officers [praporshchik] was not distinguished by cleanliness, the major, not deliberating for long, flung it onto the roof of an adjacent building. Approximately the same fate befell the necktie of another warrant officer. Once encountering guards who had set out for guard mount in felt snow boots although spring streams trickled all around, Major Dikiy gave the sergeant of the guard a dressing down. And later it was learned that the sergeant of the guard was innocent: at that time the guards simply did not have the needed galoshes size.

After an analysis of the shortcomings which had been disclosed, the decision was adopted: the officer cannot remain as a subunit commander. Major P. Dikiy was appointed to a lower post.

The demotion in his post, even if the officer himself came to the conclusion concerning its inevitability, is an event that is not very pleasant, but was it a complete surprise in this case? No, it was the logical conclusion of an impermissibly indulgent attitude of the officer-supervisors to the evaluation of Dikiy's professional and political qualities and his efficiency report. More exactly, to that line in it where negative features in the ratee's character are noted.

Once, company commander Captain Amanatov (unfortunately, his initials are not in the signature) noted the following shortcomings in his subordinate, Senior Lieutenant P. Dikiy: "Unbalanced and hot-tempered in nature, reacts oversensitively to criticisms by his superiors. Does not always realize his shortcomings. Sometimes places his personal interests above social and official interests." A year later another company commander, Major Gaponov, noted only one of all the previous shortcomings in the efficiency report: "Hot-tempered." And as if stressing its unimportance, he added: "He enjoys deserved authority among his commanders and subordinates." And he draws the following conclusion: "Worthy of promotion to the post of commander of a radio support company." And officer Dikiy was promoted.

The shortcomings of officer Dikiy were not mentioned at all in the next efficiency report signed by Lieutenant Colonel Tret'yakov. If we believe what was written, he is an ideal officer. "He displays only favorable features," Lieutenant Colonel Tret'yakov is carried away. "Tactful, self-restrained. Worthy of advancement."

Perhaps, actually as often happens, Dikiy considered the critical remarks of his fellow servicemen and generated in himself the qualities so necessary for an officer-leader--self-control and tactfulness. By no means. All those traits which were noted earlier by company commander Captain Amanatov remained in his character and were displayed in full measure in the post of battalion commander. They were also felt in previous posts. And Lieutenant Colonel Tret'yakov should have known of them and reflected them objectively in the efficiency report. But for some reason, he ignored them, just as he ignored the entries in preceding efficiency reports.

It is well known that the first impression of an officer who has arrived in a new collective is formed, as a rule, on the basis of efficiency reports. They also play a role of no small importance in solving the problem of his advancement. This is why total objectivity is necessary. One should regard attentively each line and word written by those who have made a deep study of the "ratee" in his practical activity. And when preparing a new efficiency report, it is also not out of place for the commander to glance into the future, to see which qualities have been noted about the officer, and to determine whether he has eliminated the indicated shortcomings. This was not done here.

As regards Major P. Dikiy, recently the senior commander said of him: "Self-demanding." It would be nice to believe that those practical conclusions which the officer drew for himself from what had happened are reflected here.

Complaint About Food Deliveries

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jul p 2

[Letter to editors by G. Popova, store manager of a commissary: "Only Promises"]

[Text] Dear Editors! We live in a remote garrison on Kamchatka. Our small post, as they say, was lost among the coniform hills and volcanoes.

Here is why I am turning to the newspaper. Recently, many difficulties have arisen with the delivery of foodstuffs to our commissary store where I work as the manager. Judge for yourself: sometimes they do not detail a vehicle for three or even four weeks. So there is an interruption in sugar, flour, other foodstuffs, and even matches. Not to mention milk which is so necessary for the children.

I have often turned to Lieutenant Colonel B. Shkurov for assistance, and asked him to straighten out deliveries. The question was also raised at sessions of the wives' council--it is disturbing everyone. But the matter never goes beyond promises.

Airplane Ticket Issuing Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jul 84 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Gogokhiya, Tbilisi: "The Line for an Airplane Ticket"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already turned twice to the problem of the airplane ticket--in November 1983 and in January 1984. And nevertheless, despite very

serious explanations of officials in this regard and the instructions of the Main Administration for Aviation Work and Shipments of the Ministry of Civil Aviation and the Chief of the Central Directorate of Military Communications of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, "On improving the servicing of military passengers," the problem of the airplane ticket remains nevertheless. I have the occasion to be convinced of this rather frequently as an officer of the military communications service.

For example, when preparing the airplane tickets those servicemen who have been issued travel documents for railroad travel are materially hurt. This is done, as is known, on the basis of the Rules for Drawing Up Troop Shipments by Air Transport and calculations for them. Let us say that a serviceman has been issued documents for travel from Yerevan Station to Vologda Station. He draws up an airplane ticket from Tbilisi to Moscow. In this case, the cost of a military request only on the Tbilisi-Moscow section is taken into account. Of course, such a procedure (it was introduced beginning 1 July 1978) gives Aeroflot a unique profit. But should this be done through the personal funds of the servicemen?

And who of the officers and warrant officers [praporshchik] is not familiar with the sleepless nights in airports and standing in lines for a long time? In part, this is caused by the fact that the number of booking offices preparing airplane tickets in accordance with military transportation documents is limited. This is caused by the fact that the cashiers often made mistakes when determining the distances (and this procedure is rather difficult and regulated by a reference books and by additions and changes to it). Therefore, individual booking offices are also specialized.

I permit myself to introduce the following suggestion. When issuing military requests, while still in the unit indicate the distance between the points of travel on them. This will provide the opportunity to service servicemen passengers in any Aeroflot booking office and will reduce significantly the very process of preparing the ticket: the cashier will not have to dig into reference books and calculate the kilometers. The distance between the travel points indicated in the travel documents will also become the basis for monetary calculations, that is, the possibility of material injury to the servicemen passengers will disappear.

Housing Red Tape Criticized

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jul 84 p 2

[Letter by Maj G. Litvinenko and editor's comments: "In Different Languages"]

[Text] Dear Editors! For two years already my wife and I and our two children have been waiting for quarters at my new place of service in the Kiev Military District. We did not complain anywhere, understanding how difficult the housing situation is for the present in our garrison. And then, finally, our turn came. The opinion of the housing commission in offering us a three-room apartment was unanimous. The commander and his political deputy congratulated me.

I set out for the garrison commander with the documents signed by everyone who should have signed them including the chairman of the housing commission, Captain V. Lutsenko, and the chief of the KECh [billeting unit]. When I was already in the waiting room, a telephone call caught up with me: return the documents to the KECh, it said, there is an inaccuracy in them. As was learned later, this "inaccuracy" was that they had decided to offer the quarters offered to me to another family....

I repeat once again: I know the housing situation in the garrison and am ready to wait for a new home, although this is not easy with two children. But who needed this entire comedy with the allotment of housing, the commission session, the drawing up of the documents, and the congratulation? Can it really be that the officials of the garrison do not understand that in this way they are playing on the nerves of people and abasing their dignity?

Major G. Litvinenko

The editors received a response to this letter from the KEU [billeting directorate] of the Kiev Military District. The worker of the KEU who signed the reply for the chief of the directorate, Colonel D. Khmura, reported:

"In accordance with the report of the garrison commander, Major G. Litvinenko's complaint was examined at a session of the garrison housing commission. It was established that the quarters mentioned have been assigned to another troop unit and been offered to the family of an officer who serves in this unit. Major Litvinenko will be provided with housing when his turn comes up...."

Editors' Commentary

Here, it appears, is all there was. No violations, no fraying of the nerves.

But was it really unknown earlier in the KECh or KEU that the apartment had been assigned to another unit? Does it mean that someone made a mess of things? Then who? And really, doesn't that "someone" deserve a reprimand and the officer who was deceived, even if unintentionally, an apology, in which regard a public one?

It is as if the author of the letter to the editors and the author of the official reply to this letter are speaking in different languages. Judging from everything, in the KEU they did not consider it necessary to investigate the fact that it had offended an officer. They did not want to try and grasp the meaning of his complaint; otherwise, they would have had to recognize that they themselves are guilty.

Navigator Training Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jul 84 p 2

[Article by Col N. Kosmynin: "Plus Visual Checking"]

[Text] Dear Editors! An incident which caused heated conversations occurred in our squadron one day. The crew whose commander is Captain S. Shestakov deviated from the assigned path line and was late in reaching the range. "The automatic instruments which were to conduct the airplane precisely were guilty," said Shestakov in justifying himself. And individual officers supported him. It turns out that it seems as though automatic devices completely replaced crew members in flight. Many do not agree with this. Who is right?

Captain P. Gorb, Red Banner Central Asian Military District.

The editors requested the chief navigator of the Air Forces of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District, Colonel N. Kosmynin, to answer the reader.

The lack of coincidence in the squadron aviators' points of view on the very same fact reflects the complexity of the interconnection between man and the new equipment. Similar discussions, I know, also arise at times in other air units. And it is not at all bad that aviators argue. The more profoundly and specifically the interconnection between man and machine is ascertained, the more effectively will the aviators be able to employ the combat aircraft entrusted to them and the fewer the errors which they will commit.

It is no secret that aviation equipment is improving from year to year. It is being saturated with automatic instruments and computer systems. The crew of a contemporary missile carrier uses sighting-navigation complexes which facilitate considerably the control of the aircraft. Unfortunately, in the process of operating the automatic piloting-navigation systems the opinion is formed in some aviators, primarily the young ones, that allegedly the role of the crew member in flight is reduced to only pressing a button and observing instrument readings. An erroneous opinion. Man was, remains, and will be the master of equipment whatever perfection it may attain. Just as formerly, his resoluteness, initiative, and ability to adopt the only correct decision in a difficult situation predetermine the result in the accomplishment of a flying mission.

Of course, everything that automatic equipment can provide for the efficient employment of the missile carrier should be completely used. For this, it is necessary to have intimate knowledge of contemporary equipment, conscientiously prepare it for flight, and operate it in the air competently. Deviations from the requirements of the guidance documents are impermissible. By the way, the error in the instrument readings which officer Gorb mentioned in the letter to the editors unquestionably arose as a result of the violation of the technology for checking the navigation system prior to takeoff. In adjusting contemporary

aviation equipment there is a need for the highest, I would say laboratory, precision. It should become the daily standard of people's attitude toward the assigned matter. It is important to use advanced experience in the operation of aviation equipment. And it, in particular, teaches us that it is necessary to employ in combination all the varied procedures and methods for aerial navigation, the readings of the piloting-navigation instruments, and visual observation of ground reference points and heavenly bodies.

An old but instructive case where the pilot, disregarding visual checking, deviated from the route is recalled. At that time, a malfunction in the operation of the course system occurred on the aircraft. The pilot could maintain the flight course from backup instruments, using the Sun's position. However, he disregarded this. Unfortunately, even now the use of heavenly bodies as well as ground reference points for aerial navigation is underestimated by individual aviators accomplishing short flights.

The reliability of automatic piloting-navigation systems, one can say, has "untaught" pilots from the combined employment of the means for aerial navigation and visual orientation in some measure. In an actual combat situation, the enemy will create all possible types of jamming of the sighting-navigation system's activity. The crew should always be ready to accomplish the flight using auxiliary means. How can the aviators be trained? First, contemporary simulators permit working out various special situations in aerial navigation on the ground. They should be used boldly and creatively in the course of preparation for flights. In addition, the guidance documents envisage the cutting-off of the main piloting systems for navigation on en-route flights and the landing approach using backup systems. Unfortunately, this requirement is not being implemented everywhere. The navigation training of the aviators is suffering from this.

From the standpoint of improving the aviators' navigation training, much can be achieved in the classroom. Let us say, drawing from memory the area of flights with the most typical reference points, accomplishing tasks in determining various navigation elements of the flight, and so forth. Military navigator-sniper Major Morozov organizes lessons with his subordinates in just this way. It is proper that here all navigators have a high proficiency rating and operate confidently in a complicated situation.

Navigator skill is many-faceted. In considerable measure, it is determined by how skillfully the aviator combines the latest achievements in scientific and technical progress with practical flying work and the valuable experience of the past.

Improper Specialist Utilization Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jul 84 p 2

[Letters to the editors from Warrant Officer [michman] K. Pankratov and Capt 2d Rank V. Shkurupii: "Not In Their Specialty"]

[Text] Dear Editors! The training subunit in which I serve trains specialists for submarines. Our graduates receive specialties which the fleet greatly

needs but, unfortunately, later not all of them find application for their knowledge. It becomes especially annoying when you learn that a seaman who has obtained a naval profession which he came to sincerely love is not being used in this manner on the ship.

I know this from letters from my former pupils. At one time Seamen Kozhin, Udartsev, Trofimtsov, Folomkin, Meleshkov, and Mordovin reported that they all landed in the same crew but only two are serving in their specialty.

And, you see, at times things become curious. They needed a driver in a unit and our recent graduate, Seaman Petrovskiy, already services a vehicle. At the same time, we determined that Seaman Dudenkov, who worked as a driver prior to call-up to the fleet, was unsuitable for sea duty. Is it worth sending him to our training subunit while seamen on sea duty are converted into vehicle drivers?

It is a pity when, after the training subunit, people are retrained. At times hastily, insufficient for training a quality specialist. What additional expenditures does this cost the Navy and how much precious time which is allotted to improve combat readiness is "eaten up" by unjustified retraining?

Warrant Officer K. Pankratov

Having received Warrant Officer K. Pankratov's letter, the editors acquainted one of the staff officers of the Northern Fleet's submarine unit with its contents.

We submariners are pleased by the concern of the instructors of this training subunit for the way the specialists which they have trained are used in the fleet. Their area of management is vast and difficult, requiring much effort and time for comprehensive mastery. Therefore, Comrade Pankratov, I completely share your opinion that seamen with this specialty, just as others, should be used only in their area of specialization.

I do not conceal the fact that, at times, more of these specialists come to us in the unit than we request. In my opinion, this happens because the personnel staffing organs, in distributing the graduates of the training subunits, do not see a great difference between specific specializations of seamen for surface ships and submarines.

Actually, these professions have much in common, but the differences are also very important. Frequently, the reason for a shortage or surplus of specialists is also someone's negligence or inattention when distributing young replacements who have arrived in the Navy. It is precisely for this reason that the commander of the engineer department of one of the ships, Captain 2d Rank A. Litvinov, and the commander of a division, Captain 3d Rank M. Panin, had to retrain graduates of this training subunit who had come to them.

Unfortunately, it must also be stated that we must sometimes not only retrain, but also complete the training of graduates of training subunits--those of them who do not have sufficient skills in practical work.

Therefore, I should like the instructors and teachers of training subunits to conduct lessons and drills more objectively and specifically. For it is considerably more difficult to complete the training of young replacements on combat ships and on long cruises than at a permanent base. Not to mention retraining. It is believed that such cases should be an exceptional rarity. But, unfortunately, subunit commanders at times still come up against the problem of retraining specialists.

Military Construction Service Extolled

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Sep 84 p 2

[Letter to editors and response: "Thank You, Service"]

[Text] My son dreamed of real service and prepared for it. Why do I write about "real" service? My son and, really, I also were overtaken by disappointment--he was assigned to the military builders.

I recently visited the post where my son is serving. But this trip did not reassure me. Outwardly everything appears as in a line unit: prescribed order is being maintained and it is clean and comfortable in the barracks. But just where is the very army service which tempers the men? The military builders are at work the entire day.

What can such service give my son? For prior to being called up to the army he worked as a motor vehicle mechanic and understands equipment. His grandfather was in the regular army.

S. Malinskaya, Saratov

Dear Svetlana Moiseyevna! We acquainted Major V. Belov with your letter. He selected the profession of military builder and service and work in military construction units for his entire life. He did not select it at once, but he has already given a little less than 10 years to military construction sites. He was awarded the Lenin Komsomol Prize for labor successes. We think that his opinion on the questions disturbing you deserves attention.

When, after completion of the Penza Engineering-Construction Institute I was called up from the reserve for two years of active duty I, at that time a lieutenant, of course asked myself the question: will I find here, in the army, the application of my strength and knowledge? And already after a year I understood with what an important, interesting, and thankful matter the military builders are occupied and I decided to tie my fate to such a difficult service.

Actually, at times youths who have been called on to serve as military builders believe that they were unlucky: now, they say, they do not have to smell powder and sense the genuine romance of the soldier's everyday life. In short, for them service in the military construction units appears, to put it in contemporary language, nonprestigious.

But, you see, true romance does not consist of the external attributes of one or another military profession. Its essence is in personal participation in a matter of state importance--the defense of the motherland. I can assure you that there are also difficulties and tests in the service of the military builders which require of the youths strong character, courage, and devotion to duty--everything which colors and ennobles a serviceman of any specialty. It would be impossible to maintain the combat readiness of the Armed Forces at the proper level without the participation of the military builders.

When I read your letter to the military builders working on the sector entrusted to me, Svetlana Moiseyevna, a serious conversation arose concerning the definition of "real" service. We agreed that by these words we should understand first of all the readiness of a military person for complete self-sacrifice and the acute realization of personal responsibility. Private First Class V. Aliyev, for example, spoke as follows:

"Can there really be any talk of lost time when you see the results of your work each day and realize how necessary your work is to people and the country?"

As regards service as such, the regulations of the Soviet Armed Forces are the same for all and commanders have the same requirements. For us, combat readiness consists of mastering all the fine points of construction, in which regard each day training immediately proceeds as a "finished product" and is embodied in specific work and finished production. Two years of service will leave a deep trace in the character of your son and will help him to mature and become enriched with knowledge and experience. Objects will remain on the land in which there is a particle of his labor.

The military builders also acquire a certain reserve of purely military skills. But, as you correctly noted, Svetlana Moiseyevna the main thing is nevertheless work and the accomplishment of production assignments. And you can imagine how intensely their combat and political training proceeds. For they must acquire a considerable volume of knowledge in compressed times.

And if, Svetlana Moiseyevna, your son actually prepared for service and if he displays activity and purposefulness, he not only masters one of the construction specialties but he will also become a skillful soldier capable, if necessary, of also accomplishing direct combat missions.

I am confident: when your son completes his service as required, he will return home and will remember with gratitude his service in the military construction detachment, the school of life, and the school of indoctrination through which he passed in the army formation for long years.

Newspaper Neglects Training Discussion

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jul 84 p 2

[Article: "The Newspaper and the Young Officers"]

[Text] This [The Newspaper and the Young Officers] was the title of a press survey published in KRSNAYA ZVEZDA on 27 April. It pointed out a number of

shortcomings in dealing with questions of the indoctrination of young officers on the pages of newspapers, in particular of LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA [Lenin's Banner] (the Red Banner Kiev Military District).

The chief of the department for organizational and party work of the Political Department, Red Banner Kiev Military District, Colonel A. Galay, reported: the press survey was discussed at a session of the editorial board of the newspaper LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA. Specific recommendations were expressed which were directed toward the broader and more profound dealing with questions of indoctrinating young officers. In particular, attention was directed toward such problems as the Marxist-Leninist training of recent school graduates and the individual work of senior commanders and chiefs with them.

A reply was also received from the editor-in-chief of the newspaper LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, Lieutenant Colonel A. Rogach. He reported that the recommendations expressed at the session of the editorial board and the short editorial board thematic meeting for improving the handling of questions concerning the indoctrination of young officers in the newspaper are being implemented. Several articles on this subject have appeared recently. A number of materials have been published in the newspaper under the heading, "Lieutenants' Years."

In publishing these replies to the newspaper article, the editors call attention to the fact that the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Kiev Military District and the editors of the newspaper LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA required more than two months (and what is more, after a second reminder) to report on measures which were adopted on the criticisms contained in the survey.

Officer's Advancement Unjustifiably Delayed

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Aug 84 p 2

[Letter to editors and editors' reply: "Prolonged Assignment"]

[Text] Last November, an order was signed concerning my assignment to a higher post--group commander. I will not conceal the fact that I was happy for a while on that day and began to wait for the extract from the order.

Time passed. Three months went by and there was still no required document. Finally, I learned that the order was cancelled allegedly because of my low professional and moral qualities. How's that for news! I try to serve in a worthy manner. I have no punishments. Why was I undeservedly punished?

Senior Lieutenant S. Shysh

Dear Comrade Shysh! Having received your letter, the editors immediately turned to the higher command with the request to check the basis on which the order was cancelled. From the reply which reached KRSNAYA ZVEZDA it is evident that one of those guilty for the more than three months of red tape is Major N. Russu. It is his fault that the necessary extract from the order was delayed so long, and then he contributed to the cancellation of this order.

For abuse of his official position, Major N. Russu received a severe reprimand. The decision was made to restore you, Comrade Shysh, to the post of group commander.

Child Refused School Place

Moscow KASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Aug 84 p 2

[Letter to editors and editors' reply: "Bureaucrats Punished"]

[Text] We have a happy family. Our small child is growing. And it doesn't matter that his father is far from us. He is a soldier. He serves in the army.

But here is what is annoying: for a month already I cannot place our small child in a nursery school. I knocked at the doors of the military commissariat and the rayon department of public education. And all to no purpose, without understanding. Help me to break through the wall of indifference.

A. Tezikova, Astrakhan'

Dear Comrade Tezikova, we sent your letter to the executive committee of the Astrakhan' City Soviet of People's Deputies with the request to help the family of the active duty soldier. The deputy chairman of the city executive committee, V. Yeremenko, informed KASNAYA ZVEZDA that despite the assignment of your child to nursery school No 91 which was issued by the city commission for assigning children to preschool institutions, its principal refused the legal request with the agreement of the inspector of the rayon department of public education.

For a gross violation of legislation in effect, the inspector of the rayon department of public education and the principal of the nursery school have been made strictly and administratively answerable. Your child has been offered a place in a preschool institution.

Interfering Officers' Wives Criticized

Moscow KASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Aug 84 p 2

[Article by Col A. Khorev: "My Husband Deserves Promotion"]

[Text] It is not for nought that we call the wife our better half, stressing the role which she plays in the life of each one. Keeper of the hearth, mother, housewife, friend.... And she shares both the joys and disappointments with us, and she is not indifferent to any of our concerns and troubles. We pay her for all this with love and gratitude.

But there is one sphere of our life into which the officer's wife, respecting her own and his dignity, usually does not intrude. Of course, she is not shut off from it by a stone wall, but neither does she display unnecessarily active interest toward it, considering both its delicate nature in general and its military specificity in particular. This sphere is the service activity of the officer and questions of the growth in post and military rank connected with it.

For the overwhelming majority of officers' wives, there is nothing unclear here, in essence: each one tries to inspire her husband to success in service, and each one is ready to share with him the bitterness of failure but, in so doing, does not exaggerate her capabilities and, if it can be said this way, her powers in resolving service problems which arise for him.

However, there also are others. Having not the slightest doubts, they assume the right to evaluate the husband's service activity, peremptorily judge his official and professional qualities, and even try to call into question the decisions made by his chiefs. Here are, one can say, several typical examples on this subject from our editors' mail.

First example. "An extraordinary occurrence took place in the subunit which my husband commands, and he was relieved of his post. I am a lawyer by education and believe that this is incommensurable with the degree of his guilt. The purpose of any punishment is to correct a person and you don't correct anyone by this. Understand me correctly, I am not for freeing my husband from any punishment, but I am against such severity."

We write to the dear reader that Article 117 of the Disciplinary Regulations of the Soviet Armed Forces prohibits complaining about the severity of disciplinary punishment if the commander (chief) did not exceed the disciplinary authority granted to him. It would appear that such an argument is irrefutable for a lawyer. On the contrary! An objection immediately follows in response to us: I am not a serviceman and the Disciplinary Regulations are not extended to me.... A cock and bull story begins. More correctly, it does not begin, but continues: It began considerably earlier, in those echelons to which this woman had already appealed.

Second example. "I am sure that my husband deserves completely the awarding of the next military rank but it has not been awarded to him all the same.... All his classmates in the school passed him long ago and we are already tired of waiting.... Please convince his chiefs and help to keep our family happy...."

The appropriate inquiry goes to the location, and it is learned that the husband of this woman cannot be awarded the next military rank for the post which he occupies and he does not deserve a promotion: he has a careless attitude toward service and abuses alcohol. This is what should attract the gaze of his combat lady friend! If you look, it would be for the benefit of the family and for service.

Third example. "My husband was demoted in his post allegedly for a breakdown in his work. But this is incorrect: he was in that post for only eight months. Can one really mess up his work in such a period?"

He can, we answer, and can both mess up and mend things in a shorter period. It depends on how this work is undertaken and how it is conducted....

The list of such examples could continue. Among them we would also find messages with more serious and convincing argumentation in favor of the "bypassed" or "offended" officer. However, in reading them and, at times, being filled with confidence and sympathy for the author, at the same time you catch yourself doubting the high professional qualities of the worker for whom the wife intercedes. What is he--uneducated? Doesn't he know the service?

It is a pity that this natural psychological reaction is not foreseen and not considered by those wives who assume the role of solicitor for the husband's official matters which is not proper for them, and really by the officers themselves who hide behind the wife's back at a difficult moment.

In the letters, by the way, there is no lack of assurances that allegedly the husband does not even suspect the wife's efforts. As they say, a new legend can hardly be believed. But even if we assume that this is true, then the question also arises--who does such a truth adorn? In any case, the officer shares with his wife at least half the guilt for her unethical and immodest behavior in this situation.

For it is not for nought that we call the wife our better half.

And it is not for nought that the proverb says that the helmsman is responsible for the boat, and the husband--for the wife.

Contract Construction Brigade Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Aug 84 p 2

[Letter to editors by Yu. Pshenov, Soviet Army worker, Red Banner Far East Military District, "We Descended Slowly"]

[Text] It was with great interest that I read the article by P. Il'chenko, "The Authority of Skillful Labor," and I really envied my builder colleague. I am in charge of a combined cost-accounting brigade which combines masons, carpenter-concrete workers, and welders. Its personnel also include a tower crane operator, an electrical mechanic, and a tool maker. Basically, they are military builders although there are also several workers of the Soviet Army.

Our brigade was formed three years ago. We signed the first contract with the work supervisor's section in a ceremonial, festive environment and in the presence of the leaders of cooperating organizations. Their interested attitude toward the new form for the organization of labor was felt from the very first steps. Accordingly, we also worked indefatigably. By the end of the year the accomplishment of the production standard in the brigade reached 168 percent with good quality of work. We were awarded a monetary bonus in accordance with the results of socialist competition among the cost-accounting brigades of the Soviet Ministry of Defense.

By that time the collective, as they say, stood on its feet and was strengthened: the qualifications of the military builders were raised. We created necessary living conveniences for ourselves at the installations and set up a Lenin Room in one of the small cars. And the main thing is that two cost-accounting brigades have already followed in our footsteps. Precisely those who "close" the production chain behind us--the plasterers and painters.

It would appear that there are all conditions to develop the contract methods for the organization of labor even farther--to create one combined brigade which would turn over installations ready for use. This is the order of the times. But the command was changed in the work supervisor's section, and the attitude toward the contract changed sharply. The brigade not only was not enlarged; it was divided into two parts which were sent to installations at a considerable distance from one another.

A lack of coordination and interruptions in material and technical support began in the work. Thus, at one of the construction sites it was necessary to perform virtually all work manually--no truck-mounted crane was provided although the organization had such a capability. At another facility we ourselves were forced to remove the groundwork below the zero datum in order to begin "our" stone work. And last year, idling because of a lack of materials and equipment began to be turned into a system.

What is even more vexing is that at one time they did not permit us to take the mobile Lenin Room to one of the new installations and it later burned up because of someone's carelessness.

This year, virtually nothing changed for the better. At meetings, they often say that there are not enough workers in the organization. But how can this be? Our brigade, for example, uses about 80 percent of its capabilities and others, I believe, no more.

We have a dream in the brigade--to put two million rubles of capital investment into operation in a year. There are internal reserves for this, first of all in strengthening organization and order. Therefore, we are conducting active indoctrinational work among the military builders, and the officers and warrant officers [praporshchik] are displaying great initiative here. But all this work is frequently reduced to nought because conditions have not been created for the broad introduction of contracting and it exists only on paper. According to reports there are nine cost-accounting brigades in our work supervisor's section, but in fact there are two, and they work in a slipshod manner. I believe that there can be no putting up with such a state of affairs. Both the material and moral losses from this are too great.

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CSO: 1801/411

ARMED FORCES

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA ON MOUNTAIN TRAINING

PM171006 [Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 August 1984 Second Edition carries on page 2, under the rubric "Your Sons Are Serving Here" and the headline "Ascent Continues," a 1,400-word report datelined "Red Banner Central Asian Military District" by our correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Ladin replying to a letter from a war veteran named Linchevskiy who says that he knows "how important it is not to rely on wheels" in wartime and asks how soldiers are trained "for difficult fighting in mountain conditions." Ladin makes general observations about mountain fighting, details the progress of Linchevskiy's son, who is serving in the area, and states that the mountain training consists of "short forced marches" and that the subunits conduct monthly day and night orientation exercises in the mountains, and march by compass or star bearings.

CSO: 1801/5

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

MOSCOW MD OFFICER IDENTIFIED

PM221351 [Editorial Report] Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian on 19 August carries on page 3 a 1,000-word article entitled "On the Alert!", pegged to USSR Air Forces Day, and attributed to "Lieutenant General of Aviation I. Dmitriyev, commander of aviation of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District."

CSO: 1801/5

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

'IMPERIALIST MERCENARIES' REPORTED CRUSHED--Boris (Savadyan), our correspondent in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, reports: The Afghan Army is continuing its successful combat operations against the bands of imperialist mercenaries which are being infiltrated from outside. A major band belonging to the Karakt-e Islamic group was destroyed a few days ago in Ghazni Province. There, in the neighborhood of (?Skakul) mountain, the bandits created a number of reinforced centers. From there, the bandits carried out night attacks against peaceful inhabitants. They hampered consolidation of state authority in adjacent areas, and carried out attacks upon columns passing through. They also engaged in sabotage and terrorism. Now, the band has been smashed. A meeting took place to mark this in Ghazni, the provincial center. [Excerpt] [Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 5 Aug 84 LD]

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